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ABSTRACT
This project provides a comprehensive assessment of the counter-insurgency (COIN)
operations being conducted against the al Huthis. Specifically, how effective the Arab
coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm, Operation Restoring Hope, and Operation Golden
Arrow have been in achieving their stated goals and common COIN principles. The 2011
International Security Assistance Forces’ (ISAF) assessment paradigm is used in evaluating
four domains of each operation. The four domains are security, governance, socio-economics,
and relations-partnerships. The chosen indicators provide enough specificity to create a
comprehensive assessment on both operational and campaign levels. The assessments of each
operation show that the socio-economic and governance domains need the greatest
improvements. There are also some security aspects that need to be addressed, such as, the
combating of all other terrorist groups; particularly Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) and Islamic State’s walayits (ISIS).
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Introduction
“Creating a political-military-economic strategy to defeat an insurgency is every bit as revolutionary
as planning to overthrow a government, and a great deal more difficult” (Nagl, p. 196, 2002).
On March 25th of 2015, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) initiated a counter-insurgency (COIN)
campaign by launching air strikes on designated Yemenis’ military targets controlled by combative
Huthis. The Huthis of Yemen are known for being a part of the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam and comprise
about 40 percent of Yemen’s population. Not all Huthis are a designated threat but the distinction
between combatants and non-combatants are vague as a result of the fog of war. The ongoing
military operations in Yemen are just the beginning of what is likely to be a protracted war based on
historical durations of COIN. Eventually, the Huthis might be defeated militarily but their ability to
conduct terrorist attacks will likely remain; as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore,
the coalition’s COIN tactics have empowered Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic
State’s Walayits (ISIS) as they continue to take advantage of the country’s political vacuum through
expansion of territorial control. The current state of affairs in Yemen has resonating implications for
Yemen, the Middle East, and the United States of America as the country becomes a hot bed for
jihadist terrorists.
Retired US Army Lt. Coronel John Nagl’s remarks on COIN being more difficult than planning to
overthrow a government are accurate for this case. In fact, the Huthi’s overthrew the government of
Yemen in a “glorious revolution” in approximately one month (Al Jazeera 1, 2015). Although there
were historical and conditional factors that aided their abilities to completely control the
government in such a short time frame, it remains impressively quick. The dysfunctional state of
Yemen politics, their failed policies, and their inability to previously thwart the Huthis through
military means, factored into helping the Huthis garner support and expand control of territory.
These factors are important for determining the proper COIN approaches and tactics such as
addressing government legitimacy and relying less on military means to find success.
The Arab coalition’s COIN campaign is entering its tenth month of fighting against the Huthis.
Additionally, there have been several thousand non-combatants killed, indirect support to AQAP and
ISIS, and continuation of poor socio-economic conditions. These articulations are one sided and do
not mean the COIN campaign is failing or the approach of relying heavily on air-strikes is wrong. It is
a testament to Nagl’s statement on creating a solution to an insurgency is difficult. A comprehensive
evaluation of the COIN campaign will afford policy makers a better idea of what to expect in the near
future and how to mitigate the negative effects and embrace the positives.
The ongoing fighting between the Houthis, Arab coalition forces, tribal factions, regime loyalists, and
jihadist terrorists is not a new occurrence in Yemen. The Huthis have been fighting the Government
of Yemen (GoY) for over ten years; with six “Sa’da wars” occurring between 2004 and 2010 (Salmoni,
Loidolt, and Wells, p.xv, 2010). The presence of large Arab coalition forces against the Houthis is
relatively unique in this instance. Saudi Arabia was involved in the previous Sa’da wars but in a less
outstanding role. The current coalition’s makeup of multiple Arab nations extends beyond being a
unique instance of regional allegiance and has great value to Middle Eastern defense ministries and
the United States Department of Defense (DOD). The COIN campaign in Yemen is allowing the US to
take a back seat role and actively monitor how effective Arab partners are at fighting irregular wars
in the Middle East. The COIN campaign in Yemen provides new evidence of an Arab coalition’s ability
to spearhead COIN operations, and how that information can be applied to other conflicts in the
region.
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The GoY previously implemented a poorly constructed and executed COIN strategy; and as result did
not address any core grievances, weakened the central government, and indirectly supported AlQaeda. The result of failing to implement successful COIN principles was protraction, exhaustion,
and revolution. The Arab coalition’s ability to recognize the previous GoY failures is necessary to
deduce a successful campaign against the Huthis. Furthermore, they must realize that COIN
campaigns, especially successful ones, usually last over a decade (Cambell, O’Hanlon, and Shapiro,
p.24, 2009). The coalition’s success toward removing the Houthis militant support is an aggregate
process of assessing and adapting their COIN approach.
Research Question
The operational environment of a counter insurgency operation is constantly changing in accordance
to policy implementations and evolving strategies. The importance of Yemen as a country fighting
terrorism and the combat effectiveness of an Arab coalition has motivated me to assess the
effectiveness of the coalition’s COIN operations in Yemen. Specifically, how effective have Operation
Decisive Storm, Operation Restoring Hope, and Operation Golden Arrow been in achieving their
stated goals and common COIN principles? Each operation will be assed in four domains: security,
governance, socio-economics, and relationships. These four domains encapsulate a broad extent of
the problems in COIN, while remaining specific enough to be comprehensive. For example
relationships, are defined by multiple relations that benefit an operation, such as, local tribes
fighting for the coalition or a regional country hindering operational success, such as, Iran. The
assessment is concluded with aggregating the individual assessments to provide a complete macro
level perspective of the entire COIN campaign.
This assessment is needed for informative evaluation and analysis on the topic for policy makers and
government defense agencies. This information is important for US policy makers as Yemen was
once a strong opponent to terrorism, particularly against AQAP, and was considered by US President
Obama to be a model for counterterrorism (CT). This project’s assessment provides information on
the success and failures of Yemen’s COIN and its regional implications, including Iranian, AQAP, and
ISIS expansionism. Additionally, this project provides insight into the coordination of Arab nations, as
they take the lead in conducting military operations in the Middle East. Including Arab countries as
the majority force in future operations in the Middle East is a viable option for success. The constant
evaluation of the Arab coalition’s COIN campaign is crucial for correctly formulating and adapting
self-interested policies.
Client Description
The results of this project would be beneficial to research institutes specializing in security, or
defense ministries in Arab states that are currently participating in the COIN operations. Other
regional and international organizations like the League of Arab States would benefit as clients of
this project because of the relevance pertaining to terrorism in Yemen and Iranian support to the
Huthis. The findings of this project reflect several important factors that can contribute to the
coalition’s mission regarding function and operations of defense policies. The analysis of the
effectiveness of COIN strategy in Yemen provides new perspective to their doctrine on COIN. The
strengths and weaknesses of this approach in Yemen allows for the coalition to see a new and
alternative perspective of fighting modern COIN. The conclusion can be complied and added to their
COIN field manual and possibly applied to other countries in the region to create a better solution.
This project provides an evaluation, which improves the ongoing functions with coalition forces by
providing constructive criticism, praise, and policy recommendations.
Successful CT operations in Yemen are directly linked with the Arab coalition’s success in conducting
COIN operations. The Arab nations are taking the lead in combating terrorist groups, primarily the
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Huthis but also AQAP and ISIS which, is directly in line with Department of Defense (DOD) interests.
At this point in time it is important the coalition succeeds because according to a Congressional
Research Service Report on Yemen and US Relations, which was published on February 11, 2015, the
DOD was continuing limited CT operations inside Yemen and the political instability had affected its
capabilities (Sharp, p.7, 2015). In the following month, 125 US Special Operation Forces were
evacuated; leaving US presence inside Yemen near zero (Schmitt, 2015). The ability to gather human
intelligence is severely limited and a lack of presence continues to erode relations with influential
Yemenis officials. This project’s assessment provides policy recommendations to help mitigate
further absence from bolstering Yemen’s CT capabilities and the DOD’s CT operations within Yemen.
Background
Yemen’s most recent political instability is another event that comprises a long history of political
violence and volatility. Yemen’s modern history includes civil wars, presidential assassinations, daily
protests, an uprising and ousting of the government, and active terrorist groups. The 2015 Fragile
State Index ranks Yemen 7th, above Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Fragile State Index, 2015). Some of
the primary factors measuring Yemen’s fragility include demographic pressure, fractionalized elites,
economic decline and development, state legitimacy, public services, foreign involvement, and
security apparatuses (Fragile State Index, 2015). These indicators have fluctuated throughout time
but have habitually ranked in the bottom 20th percentile. It is expected during the current conflict
against the Huthis for these indicators to change abnormally and unfavorably because of the
precarious circumstances surrounding war. These indicators delineate the root causes of conflicts
with the Huthi insurgency; which needs to be addressed by the government of Yemen.
The Huthi insurgency has developed from historical circumstances, political grievances, and regional
spheres of influence. Such factors are important for crafting and adapting COIN strategies and
approaches. Thus, the coalition should have already understood where their weaknesses and
strengths lie in relation to the politics and history of Yemen. To further understand the current
situation in Yemen, it is necessary to understand the historical troubles of national unity (Day, p.23,
2012).
Yemen has never had a unified national culture; being comprised of ruling systems that are defined
by separate Arab tribal lands (Day, p.23, 2012). The geographic makeup of Yemen is unique in
comparison to other Arab countries because of its rugged and diverse terrain. The ruggedness
allowed groups to remain isolated from centralized governance, especially those groups living in the
north-west highlands. The north-west highlands are an area that is mostly composed of peoples of
the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam—a sect unique to Yemen. This internal isolationism is a force plaguing a
successful COIN operation on several levels. First, rugged mountains are hard to traverse and
operate in. Secondly, bringing isolated tribes together to fight cohesively is a challenge. Also, finding
compromise amongst all of Yemen has historically resulted in two civil wars. A broad division in
Yemen, that is becoming more relevant today, is the division between the minority Zaydis in the
north-west highlands and the Shafi’i school of Sunnism located on the western coast, midlands of
Taiz, and southern coast (Day, p.29, 2012).
The Shafi’i school of jurisprudence pre-dates Zaydism and remains the dominate religion in Yemen.
Various statistics estimate the number of Sunnis to be above 50 percent and Zaydi Shias between 35
and 46 percent (Freeman, p.6, 2009). The Zaydis are often referred to as “fivers” because of their
split and disputes about the legitimacy of the fifth Imam (Freeman, p.6, 2009). Both the Shafi’i and
Zaydi sects are considered moderate schools of jurisprudence but, the Zaydis’ practices are the
closest to Sunni Islam out of all Shia sects (Day, p.33, 2012). However, the prevented unity of the
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two sects was the result of geography based on regional divisions and the Zaydi’s believe that a
member of the sada, or decedent of Muhammad, must serve as ruler (Day, p.33, 2012). The
disagreement on who is to rule Yemen is a problem for Zaydis because they do not except a Shafi’i
Muslim as a legitimate or capable leader. This is historically ingrained in Zaydis because a Zaydi
imamate ruled Yemen for nearly a thousand years before the 1962 civil war occurred. After which,
the imamate was deposed and many Zaydis converted to the Sunni sect of Islam.
The rift between the two religious schools is not primarily sectarian but, includes regional tribalism,
defined by Yemen’s rugged geography. This is an important factor to realize that historically
speaking, the country of Yemen has not had a sectarian problem but a geographic one based on
tribalism. In relation to COIN, creating a unified force to combat insurgents is difficult to accomplish
because of communication, coordination, and incentives. The ability for the coalition to harness
various tribal influences and fighting capabilities is a challenge based on the historical divisions and
lack of unity Yemen has faced. The recent rise of sectarianism violence, especially by ISIS in Yemen,
depicts how the coalition’s COIN approach is failing to combat other groups. As a result, the problem
of unification is not just bound to geography but increasingly by religion. Increasing sectarianism
complicates the COIN campaign because a political solution becomes harder to achieve. Previous
political attempts by Zaydi families failed to solve the problem of sectarianism before it escalated to
today’s levels.
The al-Huthi and other Zaydi families created a Zaydi religious party called Hizb al-Haqq to compete
politically against popular Salafi parties (Day, p.215, 2012). The Salafis are an ultra-conservative
Sunni sect of Islam and received financial backing from Saudi Arabia starting in the 1980s. The alHaqq party found support from a few members of the General People’s Congress—the de-facto
congress of President Salih. However, the al-Haq party did not succeed very well in parliamentary
elections (Schmitz, p.2, 2014). The lack of political success forced Husayn al-Houthi to abandon
politics and focused on radicalizing a grassroots movement; and later militarizing it (Schmitz, p.2,
2014). That movement was known as the Shabab al-Moumineen or Believing Youth movement and
is the predecessor to al Huthis currently fighting.
The Believing Youth movement was founded in 1992 and consisted of summer schools to promote
Zaydism amongst the youth (Freeman, p.1, 2009). Hassan Zaid, the head of the al-Haqq party claims
that the Believing Youth movement was the first step of radicalization of the Zaydis (Freeman, p.1,
2009). The Believing Youth remained relatively non-violent in the 1990s but, changed in 2002. In
2002, Husayn al-Huthi encouraged his followers to shout “God is Great! Death to America and
Israel!” This slogan, is originally associated with Hezbollah and Iranians during the 1979 Iranian
revolution. Husayn is thought to of found some inspiration from this quote when he was exiled to
Syria and had contact with programs sponsored by Hezbollah (Day, p.216, 2012). The use of this
quote is often brought up in context of linking Iranian involvement with the Huthis.
The connection between the Huthis and Iran is important for this COIN campaign’s ability to
succeed. Aid between insurgents and other nations is a hindrance to COIN and has historically
proven to be effective in losing a COIN campaign. The US war in Vietnam and Soviet war in
Afghanistan are two examples of how outside support to an insurgency can drastically alter the
playing field in favor of the insurgence. The slogan eventually spread throughout Yemen, resonating
out of the Yemeni’s capital during the 2003 Iraq invasion by the US. Husayn al-Huthi used this slogan
to create mass opposition against Salih and it found legitimacy because of Salih’s involvement in the
US led Global War on Terror. Al-Huthi had found more leverage in overthrowing the Salih
government via a chant than his days in parliament.
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President Salih feared mass mobilization by the Believing Youth’s movement could threaten his
regime beyond his extended influence. Even as a highlander and Zaydi himself, Salih was not able to
stop the chanted slogan fueling organized protests in the capital. Although, Salih is Zaydi, his politics
contradicted the old Zadi imamate and reflected republican politics. The spread of unrest forced
President Salih to invite Hussain al-Houthi to discuss the Believing Youth’s grievances (Freeman, p.1,
2009). However, Hussain rejected the invitation and the initiation of six conflicts between the Houthi
insurgents and government of Yemen, stretched from 2004 to 2010. The years after 2010 are riddled
with violence and instability with the overthrow of president Salih, protests, and Huthi takeover of
the government.
In general, the previous six conflicts failed to result in a decisive win for either side. Husayn al-Houthi
was killed in September 2004 and the GoY declared they had defeated the Huthi rebellion. However,
this was a premature victory because fighting continued to rage on with intervals of cease-fires for
negotiation and mediation attempts—which never lasted. The Huthi rebel’s leadership evolved after
Husyan’s death, with his father Badr al-Din al-Houthi assuming leadership for a brief period of time
before dying of natural causes. The next leader to assume power and who currently leads is
Husyan’s brother Abdul Malik al-Houthi. Furthermore, the movement formally adopted a militant
wing, known as Ansar Allah or “Supporters of God” (Al-Karimi, 2014).
In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Huthis continued fighting for political control, particularly against
Salafi groups; including, but not limited to AQAP. Post 2011, the Huthis also had legitimate
representation at the National Dialogue Conference (NDC). The NDC was a conference to exchange
dialogue during the country’s transitional period. It was endorsed and stipulated by the United
Nations Security resolution 2051 and the GCC (United Nations 2, 2012). However, the NDC was
marred by country-wide protests, violence, and assassinations of two Huthi representatives (Yemen
Post, 2014). This resulted in the Huthis withdrawing from the NDC in early 2014 and initiating their
assault to take over the country of Yemen.
The 2014 Huthi takeover begins after the conclusion of the NDC. Within several months, the Huthis
seize the entire province of Amran, the Northern Province between the Zeydi dominated province of
Sa’da and the capital of Sana’a (Sharp, 2015). In August, the Huthis push further inland and surround
the outskirts of the capital, demanding the “corrupt” government resign and fuel subsidies be
reinstated (Sharp, p.5, 2015). Fuel subsidies had been lifted the prior month causing a drastic surge
in fuel prices. By mid-September, the Huthis clash with Government security forces and with little
resistance, capture the capital of Sana’a. In the remaining months of 2014, the Huthis appointed
regional governors and continue rejecting any legitimacy retained by the government of Yemen. In
February 2015, the Huthis successfully controlled the presidential palace, state media, and military
installations (Sharp, 2015). They placed President Hadi under house arrest and forced the entire
Yemenis cabinet to resign. Just prior to the Coalition’s intervention in March 2015, the president,
prime minister, and parliamentary members fled to Saudi Arabia for sanctuary.
Literature Review
Assessing the effectiveness of each operation’s stated goals and established COIN principles requires
an understanding of different COIN approaches. There are different methods, tactics, and strategies
for eliminating an insurgency and the following information will provide a comprehensive
understanding of what “effectiveness” is interpreted as for COIN operations in context to the Arab
coalition in Yemen.
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The definition of COIN as defined by the US Army and US Marine Corp’s COIN field manual is
“comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain
insurgency and address its root causes” (United States Army and Marine Corp., p.1-2, 2014). Often,
COIN carries a heavy kinetic and militaristic connotation, but FM 3-24 thoroughly supports the
civilian effort and focus on root causes. The emphasis on civilian efforts and addressing of root
causes is a broadly defined solution under the category of politics; including but not limited to
economics, governance, or sectarianism. The notion of COIN as primarily a political problem and
solution is supported by influential French military officer, David Galula. In his famous
Counterinsurgency: Warfare and Theory, Galula states that “a revolutionary war is 20 percent
military action and 80 percent political” (p.66, 1964). Veteran foreign policy expert, William Polk,
further supports that COIN is overwhelmingly a political problem, with it being 80 percent of the
problem, 15 percent administration, and five percent combat (Polk, p.xvi, 2007). The importance of
realizing COIN’s solution relies more on political changes and less on kinetic military action which is
necessary to properly plan, execute, and assess any COIN campaign. The two greatest political
problems plaguing Yemen are the lack of economic progress and government legitimacy. These two
non-kinetic issues need to be at the forefront of the coalition’s COIN goals.
While the problem and solution to insurgency is political, the question of what is COIN in practice
and what defines it is important. In Minting New COIN: Critiquing Counter-insurgency Theory, the
authors challenge common notions that modern COIN, including FM 3-24, have evolved from a
military doctrine to a “universal panacea” (Gventer, Jones, and Smith, p.9, 2014). It has become a
strategy and “how-to-guide” for defeating insurgents. Major news outlets, policy makers, and
military colleges have used the term “counterinsurgency strategy” to refer and discuss COIN
practices (Gventer, et al., p.10, 2014). However, FM 3-24 explicitly states “COIN is not an alternative
to a strategy” (p.1-2, 2014). A strategy explicitly denotes the goals for the particulars of a conflict. A
strategy includes questions relating how to achieve the necessary goals via the resources at one’s
disposal. FM 3-24 and equivalent publications are written broadly in context and do not clarify how
to achieve strategic goals. A reason for the lack of clarification on political reasoning for fighting is
derived from Galula’s and Polk’s statements on COIN’s solution being political. The term politics is
broad in meaning and context specific for every insurgency. Therefore, COIN as an understanding is
not a strategy but a military doctrine or set of guiding principles for actions in support of objectives
(Gventer, et al., p.12, 2014).
There are still caveats to understanding COIN as a doctrine. Minting New COIN indicates the inherent
problem with understanding COIN as a doctrine is a paradox between war requiring adaptation and
doctrine—in theory is fixed (Gventer, et al., p.10, 2014). Also, COIN doctrines derive their basis from
historical cases. These historical cases create a best and worst practices catalogue for doctrinal
principles. Strong reliance on case studies result in an oversimplification of COIN doctrine because
case studies establish pre-determined solutions to a contextually unique problem. Dr. Paul Melshen
writes about the problem with reliance on case studies for formulating solutions in Mapping Out a
Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in Counterinsurgency Campaigning. Dr.
Melshen states, “it is impossible to completely superimpose a strategy that worked in one
counterinsurgency environment with its own unique parameters on another counterinsurgency
environment” (p.4, 2007). The conclusion of Minting New COIN is that understanding COIN doctrine
is an irresoluble paradox. Abiding by a doctrine, composed of historical cases, oversimplifies the
solution and solidifies rigidity. The need to be conscious of uniqueness in a COIN campaign is
indicative of the proper independent variables to create a winning solution. As Clausewitz states
“war is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” A COIN
campaign’s approach must perceive doctrines and past case studies with a filter and be highly
adaptive to the specifics of the particular insurgency.
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Paul Staniland’s approach to understanding COIN is accomplished by defining four broad categorical
approaches for managing violence. This methodology negates the caveat of rigidity found in
doctrines. Each category contains strengths and weaknesses and can be applied singularly or
together to reach the desired end state (Staniland, p.148, 2014). Staniland is quick to state that
there is “no single optimal COIN policy” (Staniland, p.144, 2014). This notion is supported by Dr. Paul
Melshen and more prominent COIN specialists, such as, retired US Army Lt. Col. Doug Olivant and
David Ucko (Evans, Ollivant, and Ucko, 2014). The lack of a single or universal COIN policy relates to
the uniqueness and political contexts of an insurgency.
Staniland uses broad categories for managing violence rather than specific COIN approaches because
it allows for “flexible policy options” and does not call for an “application of an organizational
handbook” (Staniland, p.145, 2014). The framework used for this project adheres to four broad
categories, albeit they are different then Staniland’s the added benefits of remaining flexible still
exist. The use of security, governance, socio-economics, and relationships are broad indicators that
allow for flexible policy options to be developed. Another important factor in this frame work is the
reflection of a political solution as discussed by Galula and Polk. Governance, socio-economic, and
relationships are all reflective of political and or diplomatic solutions rather than kinetic ones. Lastly,
the inclusion of a unique strategy that adheres to the particulars of Yemen, such as, decreasing of
fuel subsidies, lack of food and water, and growing presence of jihadist terrorists are addressed
under this project’s framework. Under each of the four domains are particular policies and or tactics
that are being conducted in Yemen which have an effect on the outcome of its COIN. The inclusion
of specific policies side steps the issues of oversimplification addressed in Minting New COIN.
A commonly adopted approach of recent western COIN campaigns has been “winning the hearts and
minds” of the local population. FM 3-24 continuously supports a “heart and minds” approach for
winning a COIN campaign. It was extensively applied in Iraq and Afghanistan. David Killculen’s 28
Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level COIN defines a hearts and minds approach by “hearts,
means persuading people their best interests are served by your success; and minds, means
convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless” (p.5, 2006). General
David Patreus is another big proponent of a hearts and minds approach. Patreus, Killculen, and other
like-minded COIN specialists all extensively contributed to FM 3-24 and is a likely reason for FM 3-24
strong support for a hearts and minds approach.
The primary creation for the “hearts and mind” approach is derived from Mao’s viewpoint on
insurgency. Mao’s first principle of guerrilla warfare is arousing and organizing the people (Zedong,
p.3, 1937). His first fundamental step centers on having a political objective that earns the peoples
unequivocal trust. Mao states without “political objectives [that] do not coincide with the aspirations
of the people and their sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained” (Zedong, p.4,
1937). Thus, modern COIN specialist have reversed engineered the process of thought from Mao’s
first fundamental step of insurgency and created the “hearts and mind” approach. Counterinsurgent forces can arouse and organize the people in their own favorable interest by convincing
their political objectives are better. The crucial caveat to this approach is actually creating a “better”
political objective that favors the local population more so than the insurgents. Furthermore,
capitalizing on a better political objective may mean delivering on that promise outright or in a
timely manner. A long-term win of the population’s hearts and minds is feasible when promised
political changes actually occur and in a respectively quick manner.
The “hearts and minds” approach is theoretically a sound solution to winning a COIN campaign.
However, practically it has mixed results and tends to be heavily relied on as dominant-easy
solution. The problem with utilizing a “hearts and minds” approach is the ability to effectively deliver
a political narrative that outweighs the benefits of the insurgents. This is especially true, when the
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state trying to win over the population is foreign and labeled as an occupier. However, simplistic
actions, such as providing humanitarian aid in a conflict zone can go a long way in reaching the
population’s support and bridge political narrative with policy reality. The ineffectiveness of
foreigners wining hearts and minds only increases the need for the host government to carry out this
part of a COIN operation. Even in the case of Yemen, Saudi Arabia can be pictured and portrayed as a
foreign or occupying force and thus, the government of Yemen needs to enact good policies to
support the population and not any other Arab country.
There are singular cases, in which, a “hearts and minds” approach in a specific operation worked but
failed to transcend to the macro level of an entire campaign. In Population is the Enemy: Control,
Behavior, and Counter-insurgency in Central Helmand Province, Afghanistan, Ryan Evans, argues the
point of minimal operational success a “hearts and minds” approach creates but fails at the
campaign level (2014). The “hearts and minds” approach that occurred in central Helmand province
worked but, the larger spread of a “hearts and minds” elsewhere failed. This is important to realize
that there is not a one-answer solution to COIN but, multiple approaches might be necessary, and
delivering political promises are difficult but worthwhile.
Another common COIN approach is Clear-Hold-Build (CHB) or Shape-Clear-Hold-Build (SCHB). The
approach is referred by several different names but the underlying principles are the same. The
concept is stated in FM 3-24 as, to identify areas of maximum impact by counter-insurgents (Shape),
eliminate the area of insurgents (Clear), maintain control over the cleared area (Hold), and create
programs or institutions designed to remove conditions that allow insurgencies (Build) (p.9-5, 2014).
SCHB is complimented by a population centric approach; another name for winning the” hearts and
minds” (Ucko, 2013). FM 3-24 prefaces its definition on SCHB, as being able to be “very effective in
defeating an insurgency” (p.9-2, 2014). This statement is re-enforced in FM 3-24 by one case study
of the Huck insurgency in the Philippines. It is inexcusable to call SCHB “very effective” and only cite
one example of its success. Furthermore, the SCHB approach is widely championed by the media,
DOD, and the White House as the approach applied in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on quantitative
and qualitative measures, those two examples do not qualify as “very” effective.
David Ucko’s article “Clear-Hold-Build-Fail?,” clearly articulates the problem with SCHB and its
practical implementation. Ucko states, SCHB is logically sound but difficult to implement in reality. It
is hard to “translate military advances into political progress.” He often cites NATO’s inability to
project a comprehensive clear-hold-build campaign across Afghanistan. SCHB frames COIN as a fight
for the support and loyalty of the local population and ultimately, is building on the hearts and
minds model. However, as Ucko argues, this notion does not provide specifics beyond “exhortation
for a secure environment and cooperation with local communities.” The dynamics of COIN do not
reflect the practical sequencing of SCHB. Clearing and holding are very kinetic in-nature and the
solution to COIN is in the politics of the problem, and thus, building should be addressed sooner
rather than later. The operational environment is not static as represented in SCHB. This point is
acknowledged in FM 3-24 but contradicted by the theoretical framework of SCHB. In FM 3-24, it
states “counterinsurgents must be aware that the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is not
a phase by phase linear process” (p.9-3, 2014). Even disregarding SCHB’s implied linearity in the
word construct and sound cognition the process is linear in practice. For example, one cannot begin
to hold territory before it is cleared and not before it is “shaped”. “Building” is arguably the most
important phase because it addresses the root causes of an insurgency; cannot be conducted under
an insurgency controlled area and is minimally effective if simultaneously being implemented during
a “clear” phase. This shows the disconnect between SCHB’s linear solution and the required dynamic
solutions to compliment COIN’s dynamic environment.
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David Ucko and Douglas Olivant come to the conclusion that SCHB does not work because “[the US]
throws the whole kitchen sink” at the problem (Evans, et al., 2014). They argue that SCHB intent is to
be comprehensive and therefore, is enshrouded by a theoretical framework that puts the counterinsurgents of the invading country at the center of the solution. Ucko and Olivant believe the host
nation should have more input, influence, and control; not the intervening country. So, while SCHB is
trying to reach its long-term goal of good governance via “build” phase, Ucko and Olivant suggest a
shift toward active short, intermediate, and long term population centric goals. These goals are
reached by the host-county’s government’s active participation to provide necessary goods and
services and in the process establish their legitimacy. In addition, intervening countries provide
support through a more passive role. An example of this notion is foreign countries conducting airstrikes in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
Colin Jackson’s Government in a Box? Counter-insurgency, State Building and the Technocratic
Conceit, further supports Ucko and Olivant’s claim by examining the short term success and longterm failure of the US’ involvement in Afghanistan. Jackson argues the politics of civil war are the
politics of control and authority (Jackson, p.83, 2014). This is an important statement because
control and authority must come from the host government to bolster credibility and legitimacy in
the eyes of the local people. A COIN force must turn an offensive victory into lasting population
control (Jackson, p.88, 2014). However, if the outside force is clearing and holding, then after they
depart, the control departs with them because the host government remains on the periphery of
authority. Therefore, involving the host nation is a much more effective approach than a direct COIN
model, like Shape-Clear-Hold-Build. Jackson’s point is strongly important for a viable solution in
Yemen because the GoY has been residing in Saudi Arabia for a majority of this COIN campaign. The
GoY’s ability to establish authority, through presence of its security apparatus but also its policy
implementations is necessary for a lasting victory.
COIN approaches that increase the host nation’s involvement while maintaining population centric
ideas are considered to be “indirect.” On the opposite side of the spectrum, lies the “direct”
approach or traditional approach. The key aspect of a traditional approach includes a large presence
by the intervening country in all aspects of the campaign; particularly in the presence of ground
troops. The approach is becoming outdated and unsustainable for countries intervening in the
Middle East as discussed by Ucko and Olivant. The host country needs greater participation over the
intervening country for short, intermediate, and long term success. David Ucko and Robert Egnell
propose three alternative indirect approaches to COIN by examining faults and failures of the ISAF’s
COIN campaign in Afghanistan. The three proposed models are the “Libyan Model, Indirect
Approach, and Contingency Operations” (Egnell and Ucko, p.14, 2014). The authors preface their
argument with critical importance for clarity about the particular nature of the operations, duration,
and expected challenges (Egnell, et al., p.15, 2014); which is a point emphasized in Minting New
COIN and Paul Melshen’s publications.
The first model, the “Libyan Model” is based on NATO’s air intervention into Libya, following their
2011 revolution. The model is depicted as an alternative to campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan
because of the cost effectiveness and minimized number of casualties. However, as Ucko and Egnell
point out, the air campaign was indeed similar to the initial COIN operation in Afghanistan. Charles
Dunlop Jr. in Change: Airpower in COIN Today, argues that airpower is an underrated tool in COIN
and that it heavily contributed to successful COIN in Iraq during 2006 to 2007 (Dunlop Jr., p.3, 2008).
Dunlop is quick to point out that airpower is ineffective unless correct intelligence is provided for
deployment of air support. He supports this notion by citing sources on the increased effectiveness
of airpower, i.e. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as providing the much needed intelligence for
conducting air strikes (Dunlop Jr., p.7, 2008). The caution of over relying on imagery and signal
intelligence from UAV’s has potential to misinterpret civilian targets as combatants. A fact reported
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by the UN on the overwhelmingly large number of non-combatants killed in Yemen because of
coalition airstrikes (Ki-Moon, 2015). The other caveat to the “Libya” model is the subsequent effects
after the air campaign ends. The result of launching solely air support empowers a local proxy(s)
(Egnell, et al., p.17, 2014). This is in fact, the case for Libya currently, with an ongoing civil war
between various groups. The Saudi led coalition in Yemen has been heavily reliant on air support
but, not solely dependent on this model because of the additional support of ground troops.
However, the consequences of high civilian casualties as a result of poor human intelligence and
empowerment of proxies is being experienced in Yemen.
The second model, the “Indirect Approach” is a highly favored model for modern COIN campaigns. It
can be defined as “indirectly countering an insurgency by working through host-nation institutions
or with groups in the society (US Army, et al., p.10-1, 2014). This model is strongly supported by FM
3-24, Ucko, Egnell, Killculen, Patreus, Nagl and other prominent COIN specialists. The indirect
approach’s support is derived from it historical track record of working in a variety of different COIN
campaigns. Some of those campaigns include the British in Dhofar, Oman, the US in El Salvador, and
US assistance with the Filipino government against the Abu Sayaf Group (Egnell, et al., p.17, 2014).
This model is also currently being implemented in Iraq by the US led Coalition against ISIS. Based on
the indirect approaches definition, applications, and tactics, I have identified this model as the one
being used in Yemen to eliminate the Huthi insurgency. This identification is important in assessing
the coalition’s operations and campaign in order to determine its viability for success.
Ucko and Egnell identify five distinct advantages and three caveats to the indirect approach. Those
advantages and caveats are listed and critiqued with respect to the case of Yemen. The five
advantages identified are:
1. Local forces are used which reduce hurdles associated with language and cultural barriers
faced by foreign forces;
2. The campaign is favorable to local population because the foreign footprint is small and,
therefore, lacks the feelings of a “foreign presence” or “occupying force;”
3. Reduction in political costs for the intervening government;
4. Overall reduction in financial costs since there is no need for a large number of deployed
troops and the associated support networks;
5. Lastly, the in-country government is responsible and in charge of stopping the insurgency,
which leads to bolstering its credibility and legitimacy with the people (Egnell, et al., p.17,
2014).
The three caveats identified are:
1. The training and advising of local forces can be a great challenge;
2. Local and regional partnerships are a necessity. The necessity to include multiple parties
complicates coordination and cooperation;
3. A lack of the host government’s abilities to govern effectively and enact policy change when
necessary (Egnell, et al., p.18, 2014).
The indirect approach as previously stated uses a host nation’s forces and institutions to accomplish
the COIN campaign. The Saudi led coalition has been using coalition forces to provide training and
advising to Yemen security forces. They have also provided air support as previously mentioned, due
to Yemen’s weak air force. Saudi Arabia has also been providing a safe haven for Yemen’s
government to operate remotely. The second listed advantage is in theory correct; but because of
Yemen’s history of intervention from other Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the perception
of a limited foreign presence is diminished. The fifth advantage listed by Ucko and Egnell is waning
as the government of Yemen remains out of Yemen’s capital and the coalition forces perform the
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bulk of the fighting. The other advantages remain in full effect. However, the indirect approach in
Yemen is moving toward a quasi-indirect approach as more coalition troops become more active
participants in the conflict and less of a supportive role working through Yemen institutions and
groups within society. The transition to a more direct approach is possibly a conscience decision to
adapt their COIN solution because of the lack of results from an indirect approach.
These three caveats are greatly important in the case of Yemen and potentially are the cause of
shifting to a more aggressive “direct” or traditional approach. The first caveat, training local forces is
hard; regardless of the coalition’s inherent language and cultural expertise. The large increase of
coalition forces and equipment, with coalition troop numbers as high as 15,000 is partially a result of
the slow and disordered process of training an army in a short period of time (Al Jazeera 2, 2015).
The second caveat directly builds on the first caveat because Yemen’s fractured society and military
makes coordination and communication between military, coalition forces, Yemen’s government,
and tribal factions unmanageable. The third caveat is important because the indirect approach is
meant to harness and further the government’s control and legitimacy. However, the government of
Yemen has fled the country and only since recently has President Hadi, Prime Minister Baha and his
cabinet returned to Aden (Al-Kibsi, 2015). The return is confined to Aden, not the capital—limiting
effective governance. For further discussion and analysis on these caveats in Yemen see sections
Operation Decisive Storm, Restoring Hope, and Golden Arrow.
Methodology
This research project uses qualitative research methods and quantitative figures to establish a
comprehensive assessment, regarding the effectiveness of the Arab Coalition’s COIN campaign
against the Huthis. The comprehensive campaign assessment is comprised of assessing Operations
Decisive Storm, Restoring Hope, and Golden Arrow. Operation Decisive Storm is the first operation
conducted and was heavily reliant on air sorties to accomplish its goals of stopping the Huthis.
Operation Restoring Hope ushered in a new wave of kinetic operations and is ongoing to date.
Operation Golden Arrow is an operation launched in tandem with Restoring Hope but with
intermediate goals of re-capturing cities from Aden to the nation’s capital. The new assessment
paradigm utilized by the International Assistance Security Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is what will be
used to conduct the assessments. It is comprised of a radar diagram that poses four domains:
Security, Governance, Socio-Economics, and Regional Relations.
The new assessment paradigm adopted by the ISAF in 2011, centered on a two-tier structure for
assessing COIN in Afghanistan. It focused on answering questions in a narrative, analytical form and
included a set of measurable standards to supplement the narrative responses (Schroden, Jonathan,
Rebecca Thomasson, Randy Foster, Mark Lukens, and Richard Bell, p.1, 2013). This method improved
the old COIN assessment methodology and found praise for being a “contextual assessment” which
is a superior method for assessing COIN success (Connable, p.1, 2012). This project will use the ISAF’s
post 2011 assessment diagram to report the assessment results of the coalition’s COIN operations
and campaign. Their diagram format allows for flexibility in reporting mixed data and is a quasiquantifiable design. The diagram is composed of a single axis for each domain, with gradation
ranging from one to five; with five being the best and one being the worst. See figure 1 for an
illustration of the radar diagram (Schroden, et al., 2013).
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Figure 1:

The ISAF’s assessment paradigm is composed of a radar diagram and an analysis portion for
justifying the particular rating level for the diagram. The radar diagram is composed of four domains
and provides “a qualitative, but standards-based, method to depict the current status and changes
that have occurred in each of the four domains” (Schroden, et al., p.8, 2013). The four domains used
are “Security, Governance, Socio-Economics, and Regional Relations.” Each domain is comprised of
specific indicators that comprehensively define the broad domains. For example, under the domain
of security, there are indicators of attack frequency, magnitude, and ability to control territory.
These indicators are analyzed in context of the COIN operation or campaign and justify the rating
given in the radar diagram. The broadness of these domains is a conscious reflection of the
uniqueness of the root problems which jeopardize a country’s security, governance, socioeconomics, and regional relations. This project’s fourth domain of “Regional Relations” is changed to
“Regional and In-Country Relations” to better reflect the specific complexities in Yemen between
coalition forces, Yemen’s military, tribes, and militias.
The plotting and connection of the domain’s ratings create a shaded area that visually depicts
aggregate progress but also individual domain progress. The assigned value is based on qualitative
and quantitative analysis of those four domains’ indicators. The values assigned to each domain are
designed to be simple, numerical values ranging from one to five; with one being the worst and five
being the best. An example of the logical reasoning for assigning a particular value to a domain, in
this case, the security domain is described using the following number system: A score of 1 is
defined as “Stated Areas are not secure;” A score of 2 is defined as “Stated areas are partially
secured but with significant risk of reversion;” A score of 3 is defined as “Stated areas are partially
secured but with moderate risk of reversion;” A score of 4 is defined as “Stated areas are partially
secured but with minimal risk of reversion;” A score of 5 is defined as “Stated areas are fully secured
with minimal risk of revision” (Schroden, et al., p.11, 2013). A similar line of reasoning is applied to
the other domains’ assigned values but with respect to their particular context of governance, socioeconomics, and relationships.
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The specific indicators for each domain are chosen based on literature from COIN specialists and the
coalition’s stated objectives. Furthermore, the data and analysis for each indicator includes context
of the given situation, perceptions, and possible outcomes of actions or inactions (US Army, et al.,
p.12-3, 2014). In addition to the indicators, this project has identified the coalition’s stated
objectives for each operation is listed. These indictors directly compare the coalition’s intentions
toward their actions. The coalition’s stated objectives add additional measures of effectiveness for
each operation. The specificity of using the coalition’s state objectives in conjunction with common
COIN principles makes this assessment ideal for the Araba Coalition’s member states to use as
supportive evaluative information.
The indicators chosen are supported by COIN experts. They include David Galula, David Killculen, the
US Army and Marines Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, and many more. According to FM 3-24,
measures of effectiveness are used to craft criteria for creating assessment standards. “A measure of
effectiveness (MOE) is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or
operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of
an objective, or creation of an effect” (US Army, et al., p.12-4, 2014). However, the importance in
creating MOE’s is the ability for the criteria to provide critical information about the changing
operational environment (US Army, et al., p.12-4, 2014). The indicators listed under the four
domains are interconnected to create a comprehensive evaluation that shows the progressive
changes from the beginning of the COIN campaign. The indicators under the security domain are
chosen to represent the environment changes and achievement of the coalition’s stated objectives.
The indicators in the security domain also depict the approach being utilized, i.e. indirect or SCHB,
and its effectiveness.
The indicators outside of the security domain reflect FM 3-24’s dictation for “broad indicators of
progress.” COIN is primarily 80 percent political in nature and thus, broad measures need to reflect
“social and economic health or weakness when assessing environmental conditions” (US Army, et
al., p.12-7, 2014). Doug Olivant reiterates this point with inclusion of stronger economic and
community support in COIN operations. His support of socio-economic factors is based on his
personal operational assessment as a US commander in Iraq. These two notions embody the
indicators listed under the socio-economic domain.
David Galula created a SCHB general framework for counterinsurgency. In the step-by-step guide he
includes destroying the main body of insurgents, holding the area after destroying them, securing
the population, and setting up means for good governance (Galula, p.59, 1964). These principles
mimic the indicators of “territory control,” “number of non-combatant casualties,” “legitimacy and
functioning” of the government. The first two indictors fall under the security domain; and are
important for realizing that while, COIN is primarily political, killing must occur to be successful. The
legitimacy and functioning indicators are further supported by Galula by stating “counterinsurgents
reach a position of strength when his power is embodied in a political organization issuing from, and
firmly supported by, the population” (p.79, 1964). The government of Yemen needs to be perceived
as legitimate by the population; and necessary for achieving positive perception which is through a
functioning organization that provides security and goods.
David Kilcullen writes a “best-practices” of COIN which includes a political strategy, a comprehensive
approach, population-centric security, effective and legitimate local security forces, hostgovernment partnerships and a region wide approach (p.265-68, 2009). These principles are derived
from a wide array of academic research including Galula and FM 3-24 but, also his personal
experiences in Southeast Asia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The emphasis of effective and legitimate local
security forces is represented by the “cohesive and competent security forces” indicator. The
emphasis on host government partnerships is to leverage “a home field advantage” and integrate
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intervening forces into host government led campaign (Kilcullen, p.268, 2009). This idea reflects the
in-country partnerships indicator. The regional wide approach is to limit safe havens and outside
spheres of influence that hinder COIN operations. The regional partnerships and hindrances
indicator reflect this practice.
Listed under each Operation title are the four domains and their set of indicators that represent the
contextual awareness of the coalition’s COIN operations against the Huthis. The coalition’s stated
objectives are in italics.
Operation Decisive Storm:
Security
• Both sides’ target selections, their frequency and magnitude of attacks, i.e. scud-missiles,
logistic routes, and number or size of conveys destroyed;
• The methods used for the attacks, i.e. air-strikes or ground troops;
• Number of non-combatant casualties, i.e. civilians killed;
• Territory control, i.e. the ability to clear an area and hold it;
• Port and border security, i.e. controlling the port of Aden to stop Iranian arm shipments;
• Cohesive and Competent Security Forces, i.e. military factions and allegiances, local forces
advising and training;
• Eliminations of other combatant groups or organizations, i.e. AQAP and ISIS.
• Achieve air supremacy;
• Destroy air defenses of the Houthi militia: SAM and anti-aircraft artillery;
• Attack their airbases;
• Devastate on the-ground aircraft and ballistic missiles;
• Silence the command and control centers (Saudi Press Agency, Day 1, 2015);
• Interrupt logistical support networks: Bridges, convoys, transportation of supplies (Saudi
Press Agency, Day 2, 2015);
• Blocking Houthis from reaching Saudi Border
• Air Support to certain tribes on different intervals (Saudi Press Agency, Day 5, 2015);
• Naval Blockade of Yemen’s ports (Saudi Press Agency, Day 6, 2015);
• “Working towards combating the menace of terrorist organization” (Saudi Press Agency 2);
• “Prevent Houthi militias from damaging the Yemeni people and its neighbors” (Saudi Press
Agency, Day 1, 2015).
Governance
• Legitimacy, i.e. the legitimate president and other key figures are in Yemen and in control;
• Functioning, i.e. public goods and foreign aid are being distributed to the population;
• “Support the government and Yemeni President’s legitimacy and restore the security and
stability of the sisterly country of Yemen” (Saudi Press Agency, Day 2, 2015);
• “Laying the ground for resumption of the political process, in accordance with the GCCsponsored initiative and its executive mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive
national dialogue” (Saudi Press Agency 2).
Socio-Economic
• Economic indicators, i.e. employment, GDP, and inflation;
• Resource Scarcity, i.e. food, water, oil;
• Sectarianism, i.e. discrimination between religious or tribal groups;
• Humanitarian aid.
Relations and Partnerships
• In-Country Partnerships or Hindrances, i.e. tribal allegiances, populous support, other
terrorist groups;
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•
•
•
•

Regional Partnerships or Hindrances, i.e. participating coalition members contributions and
commitments or Iranian involvement and support of Huthis;
International Relations, i.e. UN support;
Coordination with humanitarian aid orgs;
“Tornado Plan”: evacuate Saudi citizens and members of diplomatic missions (Saudi Press
Agency, Day 3, 2015).

Operation Restoring Hope:
Security
• Both sides’ target selections, their frequency and magnitude of attacks, i.e. scud-missiles,
logistic routes, and number or size of conveys destroyed;
• The methods used for the attacks, i.e. air-strikes or ground troops;
• Number of non-combatant casualties, i.e. civilians killed;
• Territory control, i.e. the ability to clear an area and hold it;
• Port and border security, i.e. controlling the port of Aden to stop Iranian arm shipments;
• Cohesive and Competent Security Forces, i.e. military factions and allegiances, local forces
advising and training;
• Eliminations of other combatant groups or organizations, i.e. AQAP and ISIS;
• Continuation of protecting civilians;
• Continuation of combating terrorism;
• Confronting any military movements and operations carried out by Houthi militias and their
supporters and preventing them from using the weapons they have looted from the camps
or smuggled from abroad (Saudi Press Agency, Day 27, 2015).
Governance
• Legitimacy, i.e. the legitimate president and other key figures are in Yemen and in control;
• Functioning, i.e. public goods and foreign aid are being distributed to the population;
• A quick resumption of the political process in accordance with the Security Council resolution
No. (2216), the GCC-sponsored initiative and the outputs of the comprehensive national
dialogue (Saudi Press Agency, Day 27, 2015).
Socio-Economic
• Economic indicators, i.e. employment, GDP, and inflation;
• Resource Scarcity, i.e. food, water, oil;
• Sectarianism, i.e. discrimination between religious or tribal groups;
• Continuation of facilitating evacuation of the foreign dependents and intensifying relief and
medical assistance to the Yemeni people in the affected regions and allowing the
international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance (Saudi Press Agency, Day 27, 2015).
Relations and Partnerships
• In-Country Partnerships or Hindrances, i.e. tribal allegiances, populous support, other
terrorist groups;
• Regional Partnerships or Hindrances, i.e. participating coalition members contributions and
commitments or Iranian involvement and support of Huthis;
• International Relations, i.e. UN support.
• Establishing international cooperation, based on the ongoing efforts of the allies, to prevent,
through accurate monitoring and inspection, the deliverance of weapons by air or sea to the
Houthi militias and their ally, Ali Abdullah Saleh (Special Report 2, 2015).
Operation Golden Arrow:
Security
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Both sides’ target selections, their frequency and magnitude of attacks, i.e. scud-missiles,
logistic routes, and number or size of conveys destroyed;
The methods used for the attacks, i.e. air-strikes or ground troops;
Number of non-combatant casualties, i.e. civilians killed;
Territory control, i.e. the ability to clear an area and hold it;
Port and border security, i.e. controlling the port of Aden to stop Iranian arm shipments;
Cohesive and Competent Security Forces, i.e. military factions and allegiances, local forces
advising and training;
Eliminations of other combatant groups or organizations, i.e. AQAP and ISIS;
“Their objective was to take over strategic locations in Aden as quickly as possible, clear the
city of any remaining Houthi-Saleh pockets of resistance and immediately open the airport
and marine port to begin receiving humanitarian shipments” (Obaid,2015).

Governance
• Legitimacy, i.e. the legitimate president and other key figures are in Yemen and in control;
• Functioning, i.e. public goods and foreign aid are being distributed to the population.
Socio-Economic
• Economic indicators, i.e. employment, GDP, and inflation;
• Resource Scarcity, i.e. food, water, oil;
• Sectarianism, i.e. discrimination between religious or tribal groups.
Relations and Partnerships
• In-Country Partnerships or Hindrances, i.e. tribal allegiances, populous support, other
terrorist groups;
• Regional Partnerships or Hindrances, i.e. participating coalition members contributions and
commitments or Iranian involvement and support of Huthis;
• International Relations, i.e. UN support.
It is noted that this methodology will not be completely accurate. A possible limitation of this model
is the subjectivity attached to the indicators and analysis. The quality of information provided in
conjunction with the assessor’s candor mitigates most negativity associated with being subjective
(Schoden, et al., p.14, 2013). Other assessment models exist; and can include a Likert scale or SWOT
analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats). These models do have some benefits
but utilization of the 2011 ISAF model is beneficial to security and defense clients because it was
specifically developed for a COIN environment.
There is not a single correct model to be used in assessing COIN and experts have acknowledged this
point. According to Ben Connable, a Senior International Policy Analyst at RAND, "[there] is no
panacea to assess complex COIN campaigns—all assessments of complex operations are necessarily
incomplete, inaccurate and subjective to varying degrees” (Connable, p.1, 2012). A Brookings
Institute study on Assessing Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Missions, found that they “did not
discover simple, universal rules about the proper metrics” and it underscores the challenge and
variability in providing case specific assessments (Campbell, p.2, 2009). Military personal including
US Major Jonathan W. Roginski, Austrailian Lt. Coronel David Kilcullen, and civilian, William P.
Upshur agree with the policy and academic community on the complexities of creating an
assessment framework for a COIN campaign. According to Roginski, Kilcullen and Upshur, the pre
2011 Afghanistan COIN assessment was riddled with “240 metrics and indicators—some of which
were uncollectable while others were entirely irrelevant. It lacked focus, failed to define the
problem, and was divorced from decision-making cycles” (p.87, 2012).
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Analysis of Operation Decisive Storm
Operation Decisive Storm (ODS) began on March 26th, 2015 and was characterized by the
overwhelming reliance on air power to achieve a number of its objectives. According to Brig. Gen.
Ahmed Asiri, the daily briefer for the operation, some of the objectives of ODS were achieved on the
very first day; including “paralyzing the air defenses, particularly SAM missiles and anti-aircraft
artillery…[and destroying] on-the-ground aircraft” (Saudi Press Agency, Day 1, 2015). As a result, the
coalition established control of Yemen’s air space. For almost one month the Saudi-led coalition
targeted and destroyed air defenses, ballistic missiles, airbases, Huthi convoys and insurgents. Also,
the coalition established a naval blockade of Yemen’s ports to contain and control the supply lines
and logistics of goods entering Yemen. The operation was officially declared a success and ended on
April 21st, 2015.
ODS relies on two COIN approaches. The first approach being applied is Clear-Hold-Build. ODS has
strong traits of the first phase “clear” because of its emphasis on kinetic tactics. The second
approach is indirect, similar to the “Libyan” model because the coalition heavily relies on air support.
However, the utilization of local militias to carry out ground attacks is more representative of a pure
“indirect” approach. This heavy kinetic approach is necessary initially in the COIN campaign, in order
to re-establish control and influence of lost territories. After all, killing has to be a part of COIN even
though combat is only 15 percent of the solution. The following analysis shows the success of the
coalition’s kinetic tactics and the implications of their actions.
Security Assessment
Achieving Air Supremacy:
Air supremacy is defined as “possessing the ability to operate air forces anywhere without
opposition” (Warden, p.1, 1988). This is the best achievable tier for friendly forces as it establishes
absolute control of the skies. The second tier of controlling air space is referred to as air superiority.
Air superiority is defined as “the opposing force is incapable of effective interference within the
operational area using air and missile threats” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, p.3-01, 2012). The subtle
difference between the two terms is found in the phrase “effective interference.” Air superiority
assumes that any interference by opposition forces is minimal and in absolute terms, negligible in
diminishing control of the skies. Whereas air supremacy, has no interference by opposition forces- at
all. Air superiority is more realistic for this case because the ability to eliminate all weapon platforms
capable of downing air-craft in an insurgent-rich environment is unrealistic. In order to establish air
superiority the coalition needed to render the following element ineffective for use: Yemeni’s
aircraft, airbases, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), ballistic missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery.
The first day of air-strikes by Saudi Arabia targeted and destroyed air defenses of the Houthi, their
airbases, devastated on-the-ground aircraft and ballistic missiles, and silenced the command and
control centers” (Saudi Press Agency, Day 1, 2015). Continuous air-strikes on similar targets occurred
throughout the duration of the operation. According to Saudi Arabia, by the end of the operation,
over 2,300 air sorties had been launched (Saudi Press Agency, Day 25, 2015). Out of those 2,300
sorties only one Saudi F-15C/D was reported to have been destroyed; due to mechanical failure and
not opposition forces (Barnes, 2015). The coalition’s ability to maintain a zero aircraft lose from
opposition forces, is a testament to effectively eliminating Huthi SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery. A
snapshot of how reliant the coalition was on air-strikes is represented by AEI’s Critical threats Project
on Yemen’s highlighted attacks from March 26 to April 21. Out of 20 major assaults conducted by
both sides, 75% were from air sorties and 25% from ground forces (Pro-Hadi forces or artillery from
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the KSA Border). Two of the most important target selections of those sorties have been Yemen’s
aircraft and ballistic missiles.
According to Global Firepower, Yemen has 180 total aircraft; including various fighter jets, attack
helicopters, and 21 trainers. Approximately one week before Saudi air-strikes began, an element in
the Yemeni Air Force conducted an airstrike on Hadi’s presidential palace in Aden (Binnie, 2015). This
alluded to the notion of the coalition needing to eliminate all aircraft. By March 29th the coalition
had crippled the Yemen air force and no further airstrikes were committed by opposition forces (AlMasmari and Abi-Habib, 2015). Destroying or capturing various airbases is a complimentary tactic to
stopping opposition aircraft from attacking. Furthermore, air bases can provide logistical support
and become crucial forward operating bases (FOBs). The largest air base in Yemen is al-Anad
Airbase, located in Lahij Governorate. Al-Anad Airbase was where the last remaining US Special
Operation Forces withdrew from in March of 2015. The base is strategically located just north of
Aden, making the airbase an important outpost for expanding and holding territory in the southern
governorates.
At the beginning of ODS, pro-Hadi forces were cited as “re-capturing al-Anad” (American Enterprise
Institute, March 29-31, 2015). This implies Huthis had expanded their control upon al-Anad Airbase
and within reach of spreading to the port city of Aden. On April 7th, Coalition air-strikes had
confirmed the “[Huthis] are neutralized at the airbase.” (Saudi Press Agency, Day 13, 2015). Saudi
Brig. Gen. Asiri also stated that following the neutralization, pro-Hadi forces were in control of alAnad airbase. However, two weeks later, coalition air-strikes struggled to stop Huthis from
expanding control in the Taiz, Lahji, Aden, and Shabwah governorates (American Enterprise Institute,
April 23, 2015). The control of Al-Anad remained under Huthi influence until August, when it was
confirmed that coalition and pro-Hadi forces seized absolute control of it. The coalition was able to
effectively stop opposition aircraft from attacking but controlling Yemen’s largest airbase was a
failure for ODS.
The second primary target selection by the coalition has been ballistic missiles. Yemen possesses
Scud B and C variants, which have and effective range of 300-500km and upwards of a 700kg
warhead capacity (Missile Threat, 2015). A primary rationale for eliminating Yemen’s ballistic
missiles is due to fear of Huthis launching them from the border of Yemen into Saudi Arabia. The
initial approach for preventing launches of ballistic missiles is preemptively striking them with air
sorties— a task only achievable through air superiority. The coalition also has a secondary follow up
strategy for dealing with launched ballistic missiles which is their American purchased MIM-104
Patriot Missile System. The Patriot missile is a Surface to Air (SAM) missile that adds an additional
blanket of security for controlling the skies of Yemen and the Border of Saudi Arabia. General Asiri
has reported the destruction of several ballistic missiles and missile sites from day one to the end of
ODS.
On the 5th day of ODS, the Huthis launched a ballistic missile from Sanna. But it failed to launch
properly and was rendered ineffective. However, 12 days later, General Asiri reported that the airstrikes had achieved their goals because “[they] have never seen launching of any ballistic missiles…”
The statement contradicts the launch reported by the same General on the 5th day but the meaning
of the statement might refer to launches since then. However, another contradictory statement is
made on the final two days of the operation. On the second to last day of ODS, the general reports
that no ballistic missile threats remain (Saudi Press Agency, Day 25, 2015). Then, on the final day of
ODS, ballistic missile sites at Faj Attan are targeted and result in a large explosion (Saudi Press
Agency, Day 26, 2015). There are discrepancies in the reporting of the elimination and launching of
ballistic missiles by Saudi reports; but according to them, by the end of ODS they have eliminated all
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ballistic missile threats. This fact would be proven false in later months as the Huthis attempted to
launch several ballistic missiles.
The coalition was successful at establishing air superiority but not supremacy. They were not able to
completely control the skies without opposition because ballistic missile launches continued even
after they were have been reported to be completely eliminated. The coalition was successful in
leveraging their state of the art warplanes to disrupt and eliminate Huthi weapons and supplies,
logistics networks, and command and control centers. The problem plaguing the coalition’s ability to
maintain air superiority is indiscriminate firepower. The high volume of air sorties in less than a
month caused an extraordinary amount of non-combatant casualties and infrastructure damage.
Damage, which begs the question, of whether the benefits of conducting 2,300 air sorties to
establish air superiority outweigh the costs associated to the people and government’s legitimacy.
Territory Control:
Silencing the Huthi’s command and control centers (C2) is directly linked to disrupting logistical
support networks. C2 entails communication and overseeing of troop movements, supplies, and
overall guidance of an operation. The coalition’s ability to “silence” the Huthi’s C2 has been weak.
The expansion of Huthi control further south, into Taiz, Lahji, and Shabwah governorates directly
contradicts any ability to silence its C2. The Huthis were able to swiftly shoot, move, and
communicate. As a result, they expanded control of land in the south of Yemen, by capturing the
presidential palace in Aden and capital of Shabwah (American Enterprise Institute, April 3-6, 2015).
The coalition has been limited in direct action missions to target high value targets (HVT) and
subsequently disrupt the Huthi’s C2. The inability to capture or kill Huthi HVTs is a caveat of the
coalition’s “indirect-Libyan” approach. The lack of a ground presence to gather intelligence and have
a quick reaction force, act upon such intelligence is non-existed because of the coalition’s adopted
approach. However, the coalition has been fairly successful in disrupting supply networks,
particularly from Iran.
The disruptions of Iran’s re-supply shipments by air and sea has been curtailed because of the
coalition’s air superiority and naval blockades. They have implemented a “maritime ban” to prevent
the re-supply of arms, ammunition, and supplies to Huthis (Saudi Press Agency, Day 18, 2015). On 21
April, the US Navy intercepted approximately seven to nine Iranian cargo ships headed toward
Yemen (American Enterprise Institute, April 21, 2015). The success of air superiority and a maritime
band is effective for stopping all outside shipments, regardless of their intended constituent. At the
expense of stopping Huthi re-supply shipments, crucially needed aid to the civilian population has
been limited. The International Committee of the Red Cross faced logistical problems of landing
planes, in order to deliver essential medical supplies and relief workers (American Enterprise
Institute, April 6, 2015). Furthermore, international relief organizations have faced difficulty shipping
food by sea due to the maritime blockade (American Enterprise Institute, April 29, 2015). The
stoppage of supplies by air and sea is not immune to sides of the conflict and has exacerbated an
already dire humanitarian situation in Yemen.
The coalition has disrupted the re-supplying of Huthis by destroying bridges, airbases, and various
facilities. They have also targeted locations that provided logistical support, such as, buildings used
for weapons caches. A facility connecting Al-Shagra with Aden was destroyed as a preemptive
measure for stopping logistical support; and a sports stadium in Aden was destroyed because it was
storing ammunition (Saudi Press Agency, Day 8 and 16, 2015). Another instance of hindering their
logistics networks was the destruction of a bridge “intensively” used by the Huthis to transfer
supplies from Saada to Sanaa (Saudi Press Agency, Day 2, 2015). A school was also used by Huthis as
a weapons storage facility and subsequently bombed after being evacuated (Saudi Press Agency, Day
16, 2015). These target selections are important for demobilizing the Huthis, but these targets are
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important pieces to Yemen’s infrastructure. Destroying a bridge or a school has short and long-term
implications for the Coalition. Destroying such installations is a military victory and a political failure.
The Huthis realize that by utilizing locations such as schools and stadiums the population will
ultimately be dissatisfied with the Coalition for destroying their public goods and interrupting their
livelihoods.
Cohesive and Competent Security Forces:
The coalition is made up of supporting Arab militaries but the most important component to the
security force is the in-country militias. The Saudis have called the tribal formed militias as the
“Peoples Committees.” They are pro-Hadi forces fighting the Huthis all over Yemen. Their
importance outweighs the Saudi, Emiratis, and Egyptians because they are indigenous to the
physical and human terrain. Yemen’s geographic and social makeup is similar to Afghanistan in that
the mountainous regions separate entire tribes. The Peoples Committees are the best available
option for creating tribal allegiances against the Huthis and directly combating them on the ground.
The Saudi’s have actively and successfully been supporting various pro-Hadi forces by providing
arms, ammunition, and medical supplies (American Enterprise Institute, April 6, 2015 and Saudi
Press Agency, Day 16, 18, 25, 2015). There has been a strong commitment to pro-Hadi forces in the
South of Yemen, particular to the areas in and round Aden. The downside of this strategy is the lack
of military training the militias have to effectively coordinate and capture positions.
Eliminations of other combatant groups:
According to Brig. Gen. Asiri, the lack of legitimacy in Yemen has a direct correlation with the
proliferation of militias and spread of terrorist groups (Saudi Press Agency, Day 8, 2015). Asiri’s
supportive evidence for claiming the incubation of terrorist groups in Yemen is the “cooperation and
interception of interests between Al-Qaeda and the Houthis” (Saudi Press Agency, Day 8, 2015). The
first notion of Asiri’s claim is correct; the lack of legitimacy and ineffective governance in areas of
Yemen will cause outside groups to capitalize on the political vacuum. Both groups like AQAP and alHuthis have alike interests in seizing the moment and control. However, there is definitely no
cooperation between the two groups. The two groups are religiously and ideologically different; and
AQAP within less than a week of ODS, fought against the Huthis in Zibjibar, Abyan and Dhi Na’im
district in al Bayda (American Enterprise Institute, April 15, 2015). AQAP has also been credited with
detonating SVBIED in Lahji, killing ten Huthis (American Enterprise Institute, April 15, 2015). The
remark made by Asiri is strategically represented to carry the perceived message that the Coalition
combating the Huthis is in effect combating AQAP because of their direct association. In reality, the
combating of AQAP by the coalition has been completely absent.
AQAP and its militant wing, Ansar al Sharia, seized Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawat province on
April 2. That same day they were able to attack a prison in Mukalla and free 270 inmates, including
its own former emir of Abyan province, Khaled Batarif (American Enterprise Institute, April 2, 2015).
Less than a week later, Ansar al Sharia was able to expand territorial control of the Hadramawat
province by seizing al-Abr (American Enterprise Institute, April 8, 2015). By mid-April, Khaled Batarif,
the freed prisoner and former AQAP emir of Abyan had designated AQAP members in control of
Hadramawt as the “Sons of Hadramwat” and seized control of al-Dhabah oil terminal and Rayyan
Airport--located outside of Mukalla (American Enterprise Institute, April 17, 2015). After two weeks
of Coalition air-strikes, Gen. Asiri was asked what the coalition forces were doing to end AQAP’s
control of Al-Makalla and his response was that “work against Al-Qaeda requires different behavior
as the matter is based on the security dimension rather than the military one.” (Saudi Press Agency,
Day 12, 2015) He further stated that they would continue to assess the situation in Mukalla, and
launch an operation against AQAP when the time becomes appropriate (Saudi Press Agency, Day 12,
2015).
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It is clear that AQAP capitalized on the political vacuum in the Hadramwat province and have further
their control and interests in Yemen. The absurd comments by Gen Asiri claiming that AQAP requires
a security dimension and not a military one is a senseless comment coming from a general and one
in the midst of a unconventional war. Military force is a tool used to complete the security
dimension; after all the security of Yemen can be defined as securing the state of Yemen and its
peoples from danger and threats. It is hard to believe Asiri and KSA’s confabulation of combating
AQAP is different than the Huthis or that both groups are working together.
Summary of Results:
Objective

Score
3
2
2
2
1
2

Air Supremacy
Destruction of Targets
Territory Control
Cohesive Security Forces
Elimination of Other Terrorist Groups
Total Average Score
Governance Assessment

Legitimate and Functioning Government:
A legitimate and functional government is a crucial objective for winning a COIN operation. The
coalition has identified this notion and stated their dedication to supporting the government of
Yemen’s legitimacy and resuming the country’s political process. The primary goal of ODS is security
centric because it is deemed necessary to initially carve out Huthi control, in order to lay the
groundwork for restoring governance and socio-economic prosperity. Due to this goal, the ability to
fully tackle the problems associated with governance during ODS have not fully been justifiably
pursued and resulted in weak improvements. Furthermore, the rapid expansion of Huthi control
toward the southern governance forced President Hadi, Vice President Bahah, and cabinet members
to flee Yemen and reside in Saudi Arabia. Forcing Yemen’s remaining legitimate government officials
out of Yemen as a cautionary measure is necessary to preserve their safety but at the same time
directly hinders any ability for them to function as a legitimate or effective government. It is
understandable for the governance of Yemen to be weak in this stage of the campaign because of
the initial focus on security objectives; in order to solidify a future avenue for President Hadi’s
government to better Yemen’s overall situation. This approach is also time sensitive because the
longer the legitimate government remains in the shadows the deeper the country falls into chaos
and despair.
Number of non-combatant casualties:
A caveat to relying on air-strikes as the primary tactic for combating the Huthi’s is the lack of human
intelligence (HUMINT) from the local population. Without a strong ground presence to gather
information on target specifics the coalition increases the risk of destroying the wrong targets and as
result increasing collateral damage. On March 31st, approximately 25 civilians were killed by an
airstrike on a dairy factory in al Hudaydah (American Enterprise Institute, March 31, 2015). The dairy
factory could have presumably been used by the Huthi’s; based on other intelligence of them using
schools and stadiums as logistical hubs but, having reliable HUMINT on this dairy factory would have
shown at the time it was occupied by 25 civilians. Based on United Nations statistics, from 26 March
to 3 May, which is approximately a week after the end of ODS, 646 civilians were killed and 1,364
civilians injured (United Nations 1, 2015). The high number of civilian deaths and injuries directly
counters any narrative of viewing the coalition and Yemen government as legitimate and helping the
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population. The high numbers alienates the population from helping the coalition and pushes them
to sympathize with the Huthis.
Summary of Results:
Objective
Government Presence in-country
Non-Combatant Causalities
Total Average Score

Score
1
1
1

Socio-Economic Assessment
Economic and Social Indicators:
Socio-Economic indicators of Yemen were low prior to the operation’s commencement. At the end
of 2014, 61 percent of Yemen’s total population required some form of humanitarian aid (UNHCR,
p.3, 2015). It is expected that over the course of ODS, particularly because of its security dimension,
that the social well-being of Yemen’s people will continue to suffer and the economy will
deteriorate. The immediate results of ODS has been high civilian casualties, mass displacement,
rising food and water in-security, fuel shortages, and basic services collapsing.
As previously mentioned in the security assessment portion, the maritime ban has negative
implications regarding the well-being of the population. Prior to the closure of Yemen’s ports, the
county was importing nearly 90 percent of its staple food products (UNHCR, p.3, 2015). The World
Food Programme has estimated that as result of the maritime ban, food insecurity has risen to 12
million people being effected since the start of ODS. There is a direct trade off of increasing security
and decreasing the social well-being of Yemen. It is understandable, to initially strike the Huthis hard
in order to curtail their sphere of influence. However, with a high number of civilian casualties and
nearly 150,000 people being displaced, it seems as if future social and economic solutions to
Yemen’s problems will need to be grander and likely more difficult. The next operation by the
coalition must focus on increasing the well-being of Yemen and re-instating the legitimate
government. The coalition runs the risk of over relying on military muscle at the expense of the
civilian population and leaving Yemen in a state of ultimate despair and increasing negative
sentiment towards the coalition.
Summary of Results:
Objective

Score
1
1
1
1

Humanitarian Aid
Basic Services
Population Displacement
Total Average Score

Relations and Partnerships Assessment
In-Country Partnerships or Hindrances:
An important in-country partnership is between the coalition and the various pro-Hadi forces or
“Peoples Committees”. The coalition extended their efforts of cooperation with the Peoples
Committees by training 300 of them in Saudi Arabia (Mukhashaf and Bakr, 2015). Having indigenous
para-military forces operating on the ground is a force multiplier for the coalition and necessary for
achieving victory because it leverages the local knowledge and keep the coalition’s footprint small.
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The coalition needs to continue its cooperation and coordination with the various tribal members to
increase its probability of success.
Regional Partnerships or Hindrances:
Regional partnerships are at the center of this COIN campaign. This coalition is made up of mostly
Arab countries, particularly from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); but also includes the United
States and Pakistan. The GCC countries have been the primary provider of aircraft conducting
airstrikes but Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan have provided additional air support. Egypt’s Navy
has been strongly utilized to help contain the sea borders of Yemen; in addition to the US’ Naval
presence. Pakistan’s parliament voted to remain neutral in the military intervention and only provide
humanitarian support. Other countries have been involved in evacuating foreign citizens such as
India which evacuated 4,640 Indians and 960 foreign citizens in two weeks’ time from the start of
ODS (Kumar, 2015). Saudi Arabia has also succeeded in its “Tornado Plan” of evacuating Saudi
citizens and foreign diplomats. The roles of each state, as well as the addition of new supportive
countries, change with the dynamic developments of the entire COIN campaign.
On the opposite side of successful partnership spectrum is the hindrances caused by Iran’s
involvement in Yemen. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly accused Iran of being supportive of the Huthis—
years before the current conflict in Yemen. Iran’s current support of the Huthis is characterized by
limited financial support and armament shipments. Iranian influence over the Huthis has been
characterized by the Iranian Quds Force and Hezbollah members helping “implement [Huthi]
political and military agenda in the country” (Madabish, 2014). However, according to US
Department of State spokesperson, Jen Psaki, “[the US] has no evidence that Iran controls the
actions of Houthis” (Milani, 2015). An additional report, from another US official, supporting that
Iran’s influence over the Huthis is limited to monetary and arm transfers was reported in mid-April.
The US official stated that Iranian representative discouraged Huthis from seizing Sanaa in 2014 but,
the Huthis disregarded such advice and took over the capital city (Ahmed, Grim, Watkins, 2015). The
supplying of money and weapons to Huthis is a direct hindrance to ODS but all misfortune or poor
strategy on part of the coalition should not be pinned on Iranian influences. If Iran is determined to
be the coalition’s only scape goat for their operational failures or problems, the coalition will fail at
winning this COIN campaign.
International Relations:
The United Nation’s (UN) involvement in Yemen has been ongoing since the 2011 Arab Spring. UN
Security Council Resolution 2216, confirmed the UN’s support for the Coalitions necessary means to
protect the people of Yemen and stop Huthi aggression (United Nations 3, 2015). In the resolution,
the UN reaffirmed its “full support for, and commitment to, the Special Adviser of the SecretaryGeneral on Yemen, in particular to the UN-brokered negotiations, and its support for the efforts of
the Group of Ambassadors in Sana’a (United Nations 3, 2015).” It is important that the coalition is
able to garrison UN support because it legitimizes their intervention.
The other major international relation established with the coalition is the United States of America.
The US has been providing logistical and intelligence support to the Gulf Cooperation Council.
According to a Wall Street Journal article, “American military planners are using live intelligence
feeds from surveillance flights over Yemen to help Saudi Arabia decide what and where to bomb,
U.S. officials said” (Al-Masmari, et al., 2015). The use of the US Navy has also been effective in
supporting the coalition; as stated in the Security Assessment section in intercepting Iranian cargo
ships off the coast of Yemen.
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Summary of Results:
Objective

Score
4
1
4
3

Partnerships
Hindrances
International Relations
Total Average Score
Conclusion of ODS Assessment

ODS is primarily a kinetic operation but there are stated objectives dealing with humanitarian
support and re-instating the legitimate government of Yemen. The lack of medical and food supplies
reaching the civilian population is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis of the Middle East’s already
poorest country. The lack of governance being exerted over institutions and the fleeing of President
Hadi and his government to KSA, signals that their legitimacy is in jeopardy. The coalition has done a
good job at harnessing the Arab state’s military power and US Navy. The coalition’s over reliance on
air-sorties is causing an alarming number of non-combatant casualties and reducing the overall
effectiveness of their security dimension. The political narrative is absent from ODS and the
emphasis is on kinetic solutions; a solution likely to fail based on COIN principles.
Figure 2:
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Analysis of Operation Restoring Hope
Operation Restoring Hope (ORH) began on April 21, 2015, with the intention of restoring hope to the
Yemeni people and continuing towards a secure and stable Yemen. The operation was specifically
requested by President Hadi and not the coalition (Saudi Press Agency 2, 2015). The previous
operation had a high number of civilian casualties and based on President Hadi’s personal request
for a “state-building” operation, the intent of ORH is to shift the narrative toward helping the
population and exerting legitimate governance, rather than heavy kinetic operations. Specifically,
ORH contains more emphasis on re-instating the political process, protecting civilians, and
intensifying relief and medical assistance compared to Operation Decisive Storm (Saudi Press Agency
2, 2015). However, this emphasis is somewhat inane because according to General Asiri, “the end of
[Decisive Storm] and the start of [Restoring Hope] are a combination of political and diplomatic
action and military action, pointing out that the command of the coalition is concerned with military
action, which is to prevent the Huthi militias from carrying out any military operations” (Saudi Press
Agency, Day 27, 2015). Asiri’s statement clearly displays “his” concern is kinetic and less political in
nature—a violation of basic COIN principles. It is undetermined if the general’s statement accurately
represent the coalition’s stance being in militaristic terms and less political.
On the surface ORH seems population centric, with a winning the hearts and minds approach.
Furthermore, based on the previous operation, there is an element of Clear-Hold-Build because
Operation Decisive Storm was about “clearing” and ORH is a bridge for holding and building. Lastly,
the reliance on air-strikes, local militias, and coalition military advisors is a characterization of an
indirect approach. The coalition seems to be enacting a culmination of several COIN approaches but
the problem lies in the overabundance to rely on kinetic operations. The following analysis will
depict that while ORH has potential to be that operation in which adheres to the solution of COIN is
85% politics it misses the mark immensely.
Security Assessment
ORH’s security dimension began where ODS ended; by continuing to rely on air power to combat the
Huthis. The coalition’s approach thus far, has been to limit coalition troop’s presence inside Yemen
and rely on indirect force, via air-sorties to combat and contain the Huthis. However, the high noncombatant casualties are a reflection of how over reliance on air power without a stable number of
ground troops can lead to indiscriminate force and hinder the coalition’s COIN approach. ORH
introduces a fair number of ground troops over the course of the operation and from several of the
collation countries. The inclusion of ground soldiers can be seen as an adaptation from the previous
failing approach. As previously noted, a COIN campaign’s approach needs to be highly adaptive to
the specifics of the particular insurgency. The self-awareness that ODS was not achieving its
objectives and altering the approach for ORH is a good step with respect to COIN principles. The
failure of this adaptation and its objectives have been the failure of combating terrorist groups that
are not the Huthis, continuing high civilian casualties, and false perception that change guarantees
success.
Ground Forces:
Saudi Arabia has been providing military training to several hundred tribesmen and attempting to
unite different tribes to cohesively fight the Huthis (American Enterprise Institute, May 1, 2015). This
strategy is an attempt to harness the power and influence of the local indigenous population to
counter an insurgency. The biggest drawback to this approach is quickly turning ordinary people into
an effective fighting force. The coalition has attempted to mitigate this caveat by training active
Yemeni military soldiers to bolster the total force effectiveness. These two dimensions are not an
28

effective stand-alone policy option but better suited as a force multiplier for conventional ground
forces. A mixture of indigenous militias and conventional soldiers are often deemed necessary in a
COIN operation because they can discriminately protect the population, gather intelligence, and
assure logistical support for humanitarian aid. These three aspects were absent from ODS and show
the need for adapting approaches to better suit the needs of the environment. The coalition’s ability
to remain on the periphery of the conflict as only an air support and advising force was not feasible
as the Huthis continued to exert strong control over the country.
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were the first coalition members to
deploy ground forces and accompanying transport vehicles, such as, US made M-ATVs, MRAPS, and
Emirati made equivalent ground transports (Masi, 2015). Following the need for more effective
military forces, Qatar, Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Malaysia, and Senegel have provided troops. Not all
of these troops have been deployed in Yemen but estimations place approximately 5,000 troops
from the above countries actively operating in Yemen. Based on a culmination of news reports, the
total number of coalition troops provided by all countries is currently around 15,000; but expected
to grow to upwards of 25,000 since Sudan plans to send a total of 10,000 troops (al-Mujahed and
Naylor, 2015; Middle East Monitor, 2015; Tharoor, 2015; Sudan Tribune, 2015). These figures do not
include Yemen military forces or the trained people’s committees.
Another interesting development in the realm of utilizing coalition ground forces has sprouted from
reports that private mercenaries have been hired to fight in Yemen. In late November 2015, there
were reports that the UAE hired and deployed 450 Latin American troops—mostly from Columbia
(Hager and Mazzetti, 2015). The reported reason for hiring Columbian mercenaries is because of
their extensive fighting experiences of fighting insurgencies against the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Columbia or more commonly known as FARC. These forces are most likely seasoned veterans at
fighting unconventional wars but they presumably lack any cultural and linguistic capabilities to be
an effective counter-insurgency. Without proper knowledge of the terrain, understanding of how
Yemen tribal system works, or working proficiency of a Yemeni dialect the Latin American
mercenaries have a high probability of creating more political problems.
The deployment of the coalition’s ground forces have resulted in select tactical success. For
example, the important port city of Aden was re-taken by coalition, Yemenis, and tribal forces in late
August. There is a false strategic value represented by the success of several thousand foreign
ground troops and their in-country counterparts capturing Aden. It is easy to convolute a singular
event such as the tactical success of Aden with the success of the entire COIN campaign. In early
November, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir and his Yemeni counterpart stated that the
operations in Yemen have entered their final stages (Mustafa, 2015). This statement neglects the
statistical facts that the average COIN campaign lasts ten years, the Huthis still control Yemen’s
capital, and other terrorist groups are filling the vacuum left by retreated Huthis and withdrawn
coalition forces. It is dubious to believe that 5,000 deployed troops in Yemen could defeat the
Huthis. Even with 140,000 ISAF troops, at the highest number of combat forces in Afghanistan, the
COIN campaign was seen as a failure (Joscelyn, 2012). Regardless of the number of troops and their
security success, the grievances of the insurgency are not be remedied and the civilian population
continues to suffer from lack of basic resources and no central government. Once again, COIN is
roughly 80 percent politics and until the political issues of Yemen are addressed, hope will not be
restored and nor will tangible evidence of success.
Continuation of protecting civilians:
ORH has a stated objective of protecting civilians but the United Nation’s statistics on civilian
casualty rates continue to show the coalition’s failure at protecting civilians. As if not protecting the
civilian population from the opposition force is bad enough, the high non-combatant mortality rate
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is linked with in-direct air and artillery support from coalition forces. After one week from the end of
ODS, 646 civilians were killed and 1,364 civilians injured (United Nations 1, 2015). In order for ORH
to achieve its objective of protecting civilians, the previous figures should remain relatively level—an
increase of small variation is expected due to the collateral of fighting a war. However, on August 18,
2015 the United Nations had recorded 1,950 civilian deaths and 4,271 civilians wounded since March
26, 2015 (Ki-Moon, 2015). Those statistics reflect a three-fold increase in total civilian casualties
since the end of ODS. An even more current report by the UN released on September 29, 2015,
stated that the number of civilians killed was 2,355 and 4,862 wounded (Colville, 2015). That is a
20% increase in civilian deaths in approximately one months’ time. The UN reports that “civilians
have been killed and injured by an increasing number of airstrikes targeting bridges and highways.”
This statement also further contradicts the coalition’s objective from ODS to preserve Yemen’s
infrastructure.
The continued use of indiscriminate force and subsequent killing of non-combatants will deepen the
humanitarian crisis and alienate popular support for eradicating the Huthis. The support gained from
the “popular committees” or “popular resistance forces” is partially contingent on perceived returns
of value for fighting for the coalition. But if the coalition continues to accidently harm innocent
bystanders caught in the middle, they could be more likely to lean towards supporting the Huthis or
simply outright hinder the coalition in the name humanitarian survival. The destruction of bridges
and highways further adds to the regression of creating better social and economic liveliness for
Yemen. Not only does this kill civilians, impedes access to humanitarian relief, and daily
transportation needs. The coalition has to start doing a better job of protecting the civilian
population and decrease the casualty rate if they want to create a favorable social and political
environment to defeat the Huthis.
Continuation of combating other terrorist groups:
The combating of ISIS and AQ in Yemen has been a complete failure for ORH. The continuation of
these groups expanding their power and control is a byproduct of the war’s chaos, political
instability, and the alarming tolerance of coalition fighters’ to fight alongside AQAP against the
Huthis (Abi-Habib, 2015). The lack of punitive damage inflicted on AQAP or ISIS in Yemen, even
though an objective of the Coalition’s campaign has been to combat all terrorist groups, is disturbing
to all and especially to those in the defense and security community. At the moment it seems as if
the Saudis deem terrorist groups like AQAP a necessity to beat the Huthis, if in fact, on the ground
witnesses in Aden are correct about them fighting alongside one another. The overlooking of these
two groups to fight the Huthis represents the faulted strategic thoughts of Saudi Arabia. The
continue support directly or indirectly to radical jihadists, regardless of sect, will result in the
continued deterioration of Yemen and increase probable attacks abroad. After all, ISIS has already
detonated an IED in Saudi Arabia and AQAP has had two previous but failed attempts to detonate
IEDs aboard planes in or bound to the US. This objective needs to be addressed to win the COIN
operation in Yemen and limit the chances of an attack on another nation.
In early May of ORH, anonymous US defense officials and White House aides reported their concerns
that Saudi-supplied weapons were directly falling into terrorist hands because they were presumed
to be anti-Huthi fighters (American Enterprise Institute, May 8, 2015). The blinded support for any
“anti-Huthi” force by the coalition is circumstantial evidence that supports the Aden residences
statements of AQAP fighting Huthis at the same time and in the same place as local militias and
coalition special operations units. The creation anti-al Houthi forces with known connections to
AQAP, as well as the Saudi-led coalition’s cooperation with Salafi militias, provides further
opportunities for AQAP to leverage its connections and spread influence throughout Yemen
(American Enterprise Institute, May 8, 2015). Equally important in giving support to AQAP has been
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the coalition’s exuberant concentration on pushing the Huthis out of cities that the eviction of
Huthis has cleared the way for AQAP to come in and control the cities. AQAP have been able to take
control of Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan Province, Mukalla, the capital of Hadrawmout Province, and
even neighborhoods in Aden (Joscelyn and Roggio, 2015). The more cities AQAP controls, the less
the official government is being able to govern and function properly; particularly in Aden, since that
is where the President and Prime Minister are currently residing. The longer the government is
unable to act, the longer every socio-economic indicator will fall, and the insurgency will continue.
Although, many of AQAP’s town seizures have occurred from firefights between tribal members and
AQAP, the AQ franchise is testing a new method of pragmatic power sharing with tribes (Keath and
Michael, 2015). In the city of Taiz, AQAP has begun to “integrate” with the locals; and as one
resident stated, “They warn us of al-Qaeda but in fact they are much better than Houthis” (Ghabrial,
2015). AQAP is taking advantage of the harshness and brutality of the Huthis, ISIS, and coalition airstrikes to find a common platform with tribal elders and thus, win their influence and control. The
more entrenched AQAP becomes in these cities the harder it will be to remove them and their
popular support. This power sharing strategy is working for some AQAP members but ISIS in Yemen
remains dependent on pure terrorism to achieve its expansion.
ISIS in Yemen as of late July is composed of at least nine wilayats. Their presence in Yemen precedes
the coalition’s intervention and their attacks have focused on Huthis, Yemen Soldiers, and
government officials. Several attacks carried out by the ISIS wilayats of Yemen include the execution
of 14 soldiers in the Shabwah district, a bank raid that was guarded by state security forces in
Hadramwaut, several SVEST detonations at Huthi checkpoints, several VBIED detonations at Shia
mosques, and assignation of Aden’s governor by VBIED on 7 December 2015 (Zimmerman, 2015).
Similarly to AQAP, ISIS in Yemen has been allowed a wide berth to operate because they have
heavily targeted the Huthis.
ISIS in Yemen whole-heartily despise the Huthis for being Shia and while that narrative syncs with
the coalition’s objective of defeating the Huthis it overlooks the negative role ISIS in Yemen has on
creating a lasting solution. In about a two month time span, from October to early December, ISIS in
Yemen successfully carried out an SVBIED detonation on the Qasr Hotel, at the time the location of
Yemen’s Prime Minister, his cabinet, and the UAE forces’ headquarters (BBC, 2015). Also, briefly
mentioned, was the VBIED detonation that killed the governor of Aden and his six bodyguards (BBC,
2015). These two attacks explicitly show coalition forces that ISIS in Yemen is not bound or obligated
to only fight Huthis but, are determined to eliminate the legitimate government in favor of their
perverted interpretation of an Islamic caliphate. The coalition must begin to take on ISIS in Yemen as
they have begun to transition from attacking Huthis to assassinating key political figures in Hadi’s
government. Protecting the governance structure of Yemen is a top priority for COIN success and for
every political leader loss, the ability to incur positive change diminishes greatly.
Summary of Results:
Objective

Score
3
2
1
1
2

Inclusion of Tribal/Local Forces
Deployment of Ground Troops
Protection of Civilians
Combating of Other Terrorists
Total Average Score
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Governance Assessment
The first goal of ORH was to quickly resume the political process in Yemen in accordance with UN
resolution 2216. Within resolution 2216, there is emphasis on all parties to support the political
transition in Yemen that was previously discussed in the National Dialogue Conference (NDC). This
includes, “drafting a new constitution, electoral reform, the holding of a referendum on the draft
constitution and timely general elections, to avoid further deterioration of the humanitarian and
security situation in Yemen.” The problem with relying on the NDC specifics is that at the time of the
conference in 2014, the entire country was marred by country-wide protests, violence, and
assassinations of two legitimate Huthi representatives (Yemen Post, 2014). The Huthis eventually
pulled out of the NDC and began their takeover of Yemen’s political institutions and territorial
expansion. Therefore, using these standards is not the greatest foundation of resuming political
processes in Yemen.
The goal set forth by the coalition of resuming Yemen’s political process in accordance with
resolution 2216 is unlikely; but that is not a sole reason for stopping Yemen’s government from
functioning. With the removal of 2216’s semantics, Yemen’s government should still be functioning
and perceived as legitimate; or making great efforts to accomplish those tasks in a time of war. The
fleeing of Yemen’s government, including the president, prime minister, and cabinet members to
Saudi Arabia, hinders any policy formulation or implementation. After approximately five months, on
the 16th of September 2015, the prime minister and several cabinet members returned to Aden,
Yemen (Al-Kibsi, 2015). A week later, the president also returned to Aden. Two conclusions can be
made from the governments five month absence. The first conclusion is that a government cannot
be seen as legitimate if they have to flee their country for nearly half a year and when they return,
they do not return to the capital. The second conclusion is that being in Saudi Arabia for such a long
time, suggests that the government was not able to function even remotely close to an acceptable
level. The lack of resources, such as food, water, and medicine is an example of how the government
failed to execute its job from abroad.
In defense of the government remaining outside of Yemen and unable to execute their duties is
because the coalition failed to stop the Huthis expansion. It was clearly unsafe for the President and
his subordinates to remain in Saa’da or Aden. It seems to still be unsafe in Aden as ISIS in Yemen has
successfully attacked the PM’s location and assassinated Aden’s governor. The coalition failed in
their Clear-Hold-Build approach by losing territory and as a result hindered the governance domain
of this COIN operation. The longer the Yemeni government remained sideline the worse the socioeconomic conditions of Yemen deteriorated. The lack of governance for half a year stacked the deck
against the government’s ability to function and be in control upon their return. The implication of
this is critical because the political aspects of COIN are what determine victory. The failure of
governance has led to AQAP and ISIS expanding their control of territory. The population has no or
severely limited public goods, services, and utilities. Looking forward, the length of this insurgency is
directly correlated with the length of the legitimate government’s inability to govern in Yemen.
Another cause for concern that has arisen during ORH is the increase of sectarianism. Throughout
Yemen’s history there have been minimal cases of sectarianism. Past disputes were based mainly on
tribal rivalries rather than religion. The increase of sectarianism is a reflection of how the coalition
has failed to combat other terrorist organizations but the greatest loser is the government. An
increase in sectarianism is likely to protract the COIN operation further as ethnic conflicts in the
Middle East North Africa region average 6.7 years (Fearon, 2002). The increase of sectarianism
undermines the government’s legitimacy and future ability to establish peaceful governance in a
timely manner.
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The increase in sectarianism during ORH comes as a result of attacks on Zaydi mosques (United
Nations 4, 2015). It is important to note that these attacks on Zaydi mosque are being committed by
ISIS wilayts in Yemen and not the coalition. On June 17th 2015, ISIS Wilayat Sana’a detonated four
VBIEDs, destroying two mosques, a Huthi political headquarters, and a Huthi residential home
(American Enterprise Institute, 2015). Three days later, another VBIED was detonated outside a
Zaydi mosque in Sana’a and immediately claimed by ISIS (American Enterprise Institute, 2015). The
ISIS attacks are acting as a spoiler in the process for re-establishing governance in Yemen.
Summary of Results:
Objective

Score
1
1
1
1

Agreeing on UN Resolution 2216
Legitimacy
Sectarianism
Total Average Score

Socio-Economic Assessment
The socio-economic situation during Operation Decisive Storm (ODS) was bad and leading towards
getting worse. The coalition’s naval and air blockades and high civilian casualties exacerbated the
need for providing humanitarian relief. The Huthis have also exacerbated the humanitarian crisis by
seizing UN aid shipments and claiming they were weapons (American Enterprise Institute, 2015). The
ending of ODS and beginning of ORH suggested a need to save face with respect to failing to protect
and support the civilian population. ORH has a goal to intensify humanitarian efforts and allow
international organizations to assist (Saudi Press Agency, Day 27, 2015). However, Yemen needs
more help than ever in increasing living conditions to an acceptable level. Air-strikes have continued
to result in high civilian casualties, fuel shortages have affected water supplies and health services,
food and medical supplies continue to trickle into the country, and sectarianism is rising because of
the deliberate targeting of religious institutions.
A major cause that has effected the population and their need for humanitarian relief are
widespread fuel shortages. Fuel shortages first began in late 2014, when the government increased
gas prices overnight from cutting gas subsidies. Prices increased by 60% for gasoline and 90% for
diesel (Salisbury, 2014). There was no government announcement prior to the increase because it
was meant to hinder any attempts to start demonstrations (Salisbury, 2014). Well, the drastic cut of
fuel subsidies in one day resulted in wide spread protests and was later a major point of the Huthis
reasoning of taking over the government. The reasoning behind the fuel subsidies cut was to receive
a $550 million loan from the IMF. There was a stipulation to cut back on government subsidies to
reduce the country’s deficit (Hagagay, 2013). The IMF did not stipulate cutting the subsidies so
quickly or drastically; but rather gradually over time (Salisbury, 2014).
The fuel shortages are a major cause of a decline in socio-economic conditions because fuel is a
necessity for maintaining critical infrastructures. Furthermore, the arms embargo placed at ports
and airports has un-intentionally hindered outside fuel shipments from entering quickly enough.
According to a UN humanitarian official, Yemen is on the verge of collapse because of fuel shortages
because water supplies, health services, and telecommunication infrastructures need fuel to operate
(Al Jazeera 3, 2015). The coalition’s priorities are invested in the security dimension of this COIN
operation and as a result are heavily effecting the civilian population. The government of Yemen has
failed to enact any kind of subsidy reversal to reflect a more gradual process. A five day
humanitarian cease-fire was successfully negotiated in early May, but with the first hour, coalition
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airstrikes occurred. Saudi sources reported Huthis had fired mortars first (American Enterprise
Institute, May 13, 2015). Several other attempts by UN led negotiators to enact a humanitarian
ceasefire failed in late May. ORH’s goal of intensifying humanitarian efforts is not being reached and
it is apparent that the coalition’s concerns are with military action. The earlier the coalition can
address humanitarian relief the better chance they have at gaining new recruits for the supportive
militias and not worry about losing populous support to other terrorist organizations.
Summary of Results:
Objective

Score
1
1
1
1

Fuel Shortages
Humanitarian Relief
Civilian Casualties
Total Average Score
Relations and Partnerships Assessment

In-Country Partnerships or Hindrances:
One of the largest successes of ORH has been the formation of an in-country partnership between
the coalition, government, and numerous popular resistance forces. The number of popular
resistance forces have grown over the course of the operation and been a strong contributor in all
areas of Yemen. A particular group of southern resistance fighter has had great success in Aden (See
Op. Golden Arrow). In other cities like Taiz, the battle between the Huthis and resistance fighters has
become entrenched and has yet to usher in a victor or show any formidable signs of any; but the PPC
have made previously unforeseen efforts. However, the success in the south of Yemen exemplifies
how the indigenous population can be greatly effective in winning a COIN operation. The winning of
tribal allegiances by the coalition are crucial for maintain territorial integrity and block all other
terrorist groups. One caveat to the success surrounding the resistance in Aden is that the inspiration
and cohesiveness in the south comes from historical motivations to be secessionists. The strong
presence of secessionists is not new to the south but has been re-invigorated due to the absence
and lack of central government legitimacy (See Op. Golden Arrow).
Regional Partnerships or Hindrances:
Another great success has been the coalition’s ability to muster internal support from the coalition’s
Arab nations and also add new coalition members—that are not Arab. The majority of the Arab
coalition members have all stepped up their support to ORH by sending combat ground units to
fight. It is important the coalition remains strongly unified because a unilateral or dysfunctional
coalition reduces the probability of success in defeating the Huthis. Communication and
coordination are key variables in achieving objectives; and the commitment demonstrated by all
members seems to be reinforcing those key qualities. The addition of Malaysia and Senegal as nonArab members to the coalition is positive for gaining international legitimacy. Malaysia adds greater
COIN understanding to the coalition because of their historical involvement in conducting COIN
operations in support of combating Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia.
International Relations:
There have been several attempts by the United Nations to create humanitarian aid ceasefires and
hold peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland (American Enterprise Institute, Day 13 and 27, 2015). In both
cases neither of the coalition, Huthis, or both parties could adhere to the agreed terms or even
participate in negotiations. There has been newly restored hope that a ceasefire and peace process
will take hold starting on the 15th of December. The UN’s special envoy to Yemen, reported that
34

President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the Houthis were committed to the peace process laid
down by the Security Council last April (Nebehay, 2015). The previous attempts by the UN likely
failed because at the time the coalition had not secured any positions on the ground and
subsequently had no bargaining chips and or leverage. The success of Operation Golden Arrow has
provided Hadi and the coalition a secure position on the ground and should help guarantee their
cooperation in the talks. These talks are important for the COIN operation because a humanitarian
ceasefire will help the ongoing humanitarian crisis and triage socio-economic factors and there can
be efforts to find a true political solution to the parties’ grievances. This negotiation and ceasefire
are not guaranteed to occur and are going to be heavily influence by the Huthis attitude toward
finding a compromise and also third party spoilers from other terrorist groups.
Other international attempts to help find a political solution have occurred. According to a
spokesperson from the Hadi government, on May 31 2015, the US were engaged in “ongoing talks”
with the Huthis in the capital of Oman; Omani sources later confirmed this report (American
Enterprise Institute, June 1, 2015). A similar case of a third party talk, included Russia’s ambassador
to Yemen meeting with Saudi official, members of President Hadi’s government, and Huthi
representatives in Sana’a (American Enterprise Institute, September 23, 2015). It is unclear if any of
these efforts played a role in the formation of the upcoming UN sponsored talks.
Summary of Results:
Objective

Score
4
1
3
3

Partnerships
Hindrances
International Relations
Total Average Score
Conclusion of Assessment

ORH is a step in the correct direction with respect to adapting the previous overly kinetic operation.
The name of the operation and having President Hadi request the operation exemplifies the
bolstering of governance and need to increase socio-economic factors. However, in practice there
have been limited efforts to create effective change in those two domains. Basic goods and services
are not available to the population; including gas, food, water, and healthcare. Furthermore, an
increase in sectarianism is causing social problems that were previously not inherent to Yemen’s
society. The security domain of ORH has shifted to include ground forces and utilize tribal militias.
Even with new emphasis on discriminate force, there has been continued increase in civilian casualty
rates from artillery and air strikes. A major factor hurting the coalition’s security domain is the
empowering of other terrorist groups who pose a direct threat to Yemen, the region, and the West.
The commitment by the coalition to provide and deploy ground troops, in addition to adding new,
non-Arab coalition members is a reassuring sign that partnerships are not waning.
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Analysis of Operation Golden Arrow
Operation Golden Arrow (OGA) is the operation that spearheaded the wide-use of ground forces and
drove the Huthis out of Aden in pursuit of recapturing the national capital of Sanna. The operation
began in mid-July of 2015 and found early success by utilizing coalition ground forces in conjunction
with southern resistance fighters to re-capture Aden. The operation’s primary objective is to recapture the capital of Sanna but the means in which to achieve the primary objective includes
starting an offensive in Aden and continuing north—expelling Huthi pockets of resistance. This
operation’s attention is primarily on the security and partnership dimension and lacks substantial
objectives from the other two assessment dimensions. Since, OGA is occurring simultaneously with
ORH is safe to assume OGA has “indirect” socio-economic and governance efforts occurring. These
efforts are occurring as part of ORH and still add to the overall campaign’s success.
Security Assessment
Indigenous Ground Forces and Territorial Control:
The offensive mounted on the eve of Eid al Fitr (An Islamic Holiday) included 1,500 southern
resistance fighters, 170 MRAPS, 900 coalition troops, UAE and Saudi special operations units, and
136 air sorties (Knights and Mello, 2015). The southern resistance forces with the help of the
coalition were able to resize the city, its maritime port, and international airport. The next phase of
the operation was to complete a similar assault, in-order recapture al Anad air base in Lahj
governorate, then onto Taiz, and finally Sanna. They were successful in re-capturing al Anad air base
but the other cities currently remain contested. OGA has been successful in Aden and Lahj because
of the strong support and efforts made by southern resistance forces. But currently battles are
entrenched in Taiz and cities further north. As the coalition moves more north they lose the large
and effective members of the southern resistance and that seemingly was a key component to
OGA’s success in Aden. The importance of large and well trained indigenous forces is underscored in
OGA and is showing the need to better cultivate northern tribes allegiances. The caveat is that the
further north the coalition pushes, the stronger the Huthi resistance becomes. The Huthis are from
the northern western highland and were in control of places like Sanna long before the coalition
intervened unlike their presence in the south.
The liberation of Aden from the Huthis is not a surprise if you look at the southern resistance forces.
The southern resistance forces derive their name not from fighting the Huthis but from the historical
civil wars of Yemen. The Southern Movement has actively protested and voiced their support for
succession. The Southern Movement has a strong motivation to rid the Huthis of Aden because it
shows they can protect and govern themselves absent of the central government. So, it is not a
surprise that a group that desires succession was able to band together and drive out the Huthis
with the close ground and air support of the coalition. In addition to determination, the southern
forces had extensive knowledge of the city and access to intelligence the coalition did not. The
southern resistance fighters are important for analyzing the future success of OGA and the broader
COIN campaign.
The coalition is bound to face a strong Huthi resistance in Sanna and without an equivalent
formidable force like the southern resistance fighters the coalition has a high probability of failure.
The current battle of Taiz highlights how continuing into stronger Huthi pockets is becoming a
protracted fight. Assuming the coalition is successful in capturing Sanna there are two remaining
problems facing the broader COIN campaign.
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Security Implications and Political Outcomes
The success of OGA does not translate into victory against the Huthis because the strongest
presences of Huthi fighters are in the mountainous northern highlands of Sa’ada. The success of retaking the capital and placing President Hadi and his government in the city center will not stop the
Huthis from launching attacks across the border into KSA or within Yemen. They will still be able to
conduct terrorist attacks and hold ground in their indigenous mountain regions. The Saleh
government failed to beat the Huthis is Saa’da over a ten year period. Anything short of utterly
wiping out the Zaydi population, there will remain isolated terrorist attacks in Yemen. The ultimate
solution still remains in politics and not large kinetic operations.
The other looming implication of OGA is the empowering of the Southern Movement. The country of
Yemen has barely survived two civil wars because of secessionists in the South. There is a legitimate
concern that the long absence of a central government, indiscriminate killing of civilians, and ability
to fight for liberation could propel southerners to challenge President Hadi. Upon the freeing of
Aden from Huthis, Yemen’s Southern Movement announced renewed call for southern
independence (American Enterprise Institute, July 20, 2015). Also, the recent assassination of Aden’s
governor further increase tensions between southerners and the Hadi government. A scenario were
the Huthis are “defeated” but the Southern Movement and southern resistance fighters supersede
Hadi’s government in the south is plausible. This scenario would be trading one insurgency for
another. It is unclear how obligated the coalition would be in supporting a completely new and
different COIN campaign.
Operation Golden Arrow has found success in Aden and Lahj. It remains unknown how success will
be determined as coalition forces continue to Sanna. There is however, an increase in prospect that
the success of OGA in the south of Yemen is leading toward a renewal in succession. The leveraging
of political concession with respect to finding a political solution is necessary to solve the COIN
campaign and mitigate a new insurgency in the south. OGA is working on a tactical and kinetic level
but the coalition needs to ramp up its non-kinetic operations.
Summary of Results:
Objective

Score
5
3
3
1
3

Re-Capture of Aden
Southern Resistance Forces
Territory Control
Combating of Other Terrorist Groups
Total Average Score

Conclusion of Assessment
OGA is by far the biggest kinetic success of the entire COIN campaign. The current progress of OGA is
stagnating, with lack of momentum occurring in Taiz. As a result of recapturing Aden, the
government has been able to return to Yemen and set up a provincial capital in Aden until Sanna is
liberated. President Hadi and his government have been out of Yemen for almost six months and
face challenges to re-establish legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The utilization of indigenous
forces to retake Aden and al Anad Airbase is a crucial template for similar operation in northern
Yemen. The participation and overall effectiveness of the southern resistance forces does carry a
major implication of creating new secessionist tensions between Hadi’s government and the
Southern Movement. Hadi’s ability to diffuse and manage the situation will be good test to
demonstrate the government’s ability to function and sense of legitimacy. Socio-economic factors
are still deteriorating and need to be addressed as 80 % of the population needs some form of
humanitarian aid.
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Aggregated Assessment
Figure 5:
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Conclusion
The coalition’s current operations are approaching one year since the launch of Operation Decisive
Storm. In that time period the COIN campaign has not been a success nor a failure based on this
project’s assessment. The assessment has depicted two key areas that have consistently reflected a
poor performance across all operations. The first area is socio-economic indicators; including water,
food, fuel, and medical supplies to reach nearly 80 percent of the population. Operations Decisive
Storm, Restoring Hope, and Golden Arrow have failed to make a stabilizing effort to provide both
humanitarian aid and public goods. The lack of humanitarian aid has heavily been hindered by the
coalition’s security initiatives to secure air and marine ports from enemy re-supply shipments. The
lack of public goods is reflective of the second area that has performed poorly; a legitimate
government. The government of Yemen, for the duration of the COIN campaign, has resided in Saudi
Arabia and a make-shift capital in Aden. As a result, the government has been limited in their
abilities to enact policies and be perceived as legitimate by the people. This caveat is represented in
the theoretical framework of an indirect approach; however the extent to which it has affected
Yemen is a significant factor because it was already considered at or near the designated level of
“failed state”.
The strongest assessment performance comes from the coalition’s ability to harness partnerships
and international relations. The formation of a strong Arab coalition is a new step in modern COIN
for determining the capabilities of Arab nations spearheading these types of operations. This project
assessment has determined that the coalition is doing a good job of leveraging local, regional, and
international partnerships. For example, the coalition’s indirect approach has empowered local
militias, particularly the southern movement in Aden, to defeat the Huthi terrorists in parts of the
south. The biggest caveat to this success has been the future implications left to these empowered
groups who may have alterative motives based on religion, history, or legitimacy. More importantly,
is the rise of sectarianism in Yemen. The increase of sectarianism violence, terroristic or not, further
complicates a viable political solution in Yemen. The complication of sectarianism is possibly
reflective of how or why future COIN operations will fail, regardless of the nation spearheading the
campaign.
The analysis of this COIN campaign depicts several future outcomes of Yemen. All of which, are long
in duration and complex in fixing Yemen’s current state of affairs. There have been several attempts
at a negotiated cease-fire; a positive step towards finding a political solution. However, these ceasefire negotiations have all failed. Additionally, the increased sectarianism caused by ISIS affiliates and
potential Southern Movement uprising against the government are acting as spoilers. There is a
strong possibility that the country of Yemen becomes partitioned but based on Yemen’s history that
solution is likely to fail. The current legitimate government of Yemen is internationally recognized by
the United Nations and abandoning this support would collapse Yemen further into a failed state.
The coalition’s best outcome of their COIN campaign is to return the Huthis to their indigenous lands
and fully re-instate the legitimate government of Yemen. Any other outcome is likely to tip the
balance of power toward terrorist groups, like the Huthis, AQAP, or ISIS.
The coalition’s first operation conducted nearly 2,300 air-sorties and those numbers continued to
increase over the conflict’s duration. The coalition adopted the model used in Libya to leverage its
superior air power to defeat the Huthi combatants. However, over dependence on air power in
highly populated areas limits its use because of indiscriminant fire. The operations heavy uses of air
strikes have resulted in over 7,000 civilians being injured or killed; an outcome that reflects poorly
on the government’s legitimacy and the coalition’s inability to protect the population from
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“terrorists”. The harming of non-combatants places a wedge between the population’s support
toward the government and possibly re-aliens their allegiance towards the Huthis, AQAP, or ISIS.
Moving forward with the coalition’s tactics and approaches, the coalition needs to do more in
addressing the socio-economic and governance factors of Yemen. Re-instating fuel subsidies and
increasing humanitarian aid are strong initial steps in that direction. It is a two-fold action because it
helps the population and projects government legitimacy. The harnessing of relationships needs to
continue, in order to defeat the Huthi combatants. But empowering the likes of AQAP or ISIS in
Yemen is a real danger that is getting overshadowed at the moment. The coalition needs to do more
in the realm of direct action missions that target, what the coalition considers “other terrorists,”
such as AQAP and ISIS in Yemen. The emphasis for these CT operations needs to be placed on human
elements and not from the air. To decrease non-combatant casualty rates, the collation should only
use “smart” bombs in conjunction with special operations troops’ laser designating targets
controlled by Huthi combatants. These policy changes are not an absolute solution to declaring a
successful COIN campaign but are the best options for fixing the weaknesses reveled from this
assessment.
Policy Recommendations
The assessments show that the socio-economic and governance domains need the greatest
improvements. There are also some security aspects that need to be addressed, such as, the
combating of all other terrorist groups. The following policy recommendations are considered to
improve the operational environment for coalition forces, the government of Yemen and its peoples.
The numbering of these solutions is not reflective of their importance.
1. Guided Bomb Units (GBU) aka Smart Bombs
The coalition has made the mistake of perceiving air-strikes as the correct policy solution but
in fact, it has resulted in an alarming high number of non-combatant casualties. Air-strikes in
a COIN environment have marginal rates of return because the large number of bombs
detonated in a highly populated area is likely to incur heavy collateral damage to the
population and infrastructure. To mitigate this caveat the coalition is to use precision guided
munitions.
Guided bomb units are informally known as “smart bombs” and are a better alternative to
non-guided bombs because they maximize the probability of destroying the correct target
and only that target. The coalition should stop using non-guided munitions in highly
populated areas and only use GBUs. The recent $1.29 billion weapons deal between the US
and Saudi Arabia, includes 1,000 GBU-10 Paveway II bombs and over 5,000 Joint Direct
Attack Munitions kits, which convert non-guided units into GBUs via GPS” (RT, 2015) These
GBUs should only be used for the continuation of the COIN campaign because they will limit
non-combatant casualty rates and subsequently protect and appease the local population.
2. Laser Designators
The coalition should also increase the use and training of laser designators to enhance the
effective success of GBUs and stop unnecessary non-combatant casualties. Laser designators
“paint” targets with an invisible beam that sends impulses to GBUs and allow the munitions
to hit exactly where the target has been “painted.” The utilization of laser designators in a
highly condensed and populated area is necessary for close air-support. Laser designators
are the preferred methodology in a COIN environment because they increase discriminate
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force capabilities. The coalition should deploy more units capable of using laser designators
in-conjunction with the use of GBUs.
The coalition should be cautious of having locals or resistance fighter designate targets via
lasers or use any other demarking system. The reason for exercising this caution is to limit
locals from taking personal advantage of coalition air-strikes. Non-military personnel are
more inclined to use this technology negatively. An example would be targeting individuals
that they have un-settled debts with rather than an operation-critical target. A fair
compromise is to embed small coalition teams with local resistance fighters who can
accurately designate high value targets.
3. Training and Motivating Resistance Fighters
The success of the southern resistance fighters exemplifies the need to utilize the indigenous
population to win this COIN campaign. The coalition should increase training to resistance
fighters and motivate these groups in places like Taiz, where fighting has become protracted.
Military training is necessary for these resistance fighters but motivation is arguably more
important. Teaching a person to move, shoot, and communicate is important but convincing
them to do those things for a prolonged time is the key to success. The southern resistance
was motivated to take back Aden because it would bolster their secessionist ideas by
depicting themselves as self-governing and independent of the central government.
Other historical cases of correctly identifying a local population’s needs to usher their
support is presented in the case study of Dhofar, Oman. Small numbered, British Special Air
Services (SAS) teams found specifically, what certain areas needed; such as medical care and
agricultural goods (Hughes, 2009). These actions convinced those members of the
community to fight for the Omani government as para-military forces. The current coalition
should identify specific local needs of communities in Taiz and further north to help mobilize
and motivate tribes, groups, and individuals to join the resistance. The fundamental key to
this policy is identifying specific wants of the people and not just generalizing needs. Talking
to important tribal or community leaders is a way to access a community’s desired item or
service. This method will increase the community’s backing of the coalition much more
definitively. Without a large presence of coalition ground troops this is the best policy
prescription to continue momentum north and re-take the nation’s capital.
4. Counterterrorism Operations (AQAP and ISIS)
The coalition and government of Yemen (GoY) need to actively combat the other terrorist
groups operating in Yemen. Ramping up CT operations against AQAP and ISIS in Yemen
should be a higher priority. With the re-securing of al Anad Airbase—the former US Special
Operations base—the GoY in coordination with the US should ramp up their operations
against these groups. This policy is not a complete solution; but the longer limited actions
are taken against AQAP and ISIS wilayats the harder it will become to erode their influence
and presence in Yemen. The collation has a vested interest in directly combating these
groups, particularly the ISIS wilayats, as they have killed Saudi citizens inside the borders of
Saudi Arabia (Hanna and Tawfeeq, 2015). The coalition needs to become stricter on the
allowance of AQAP members fighting alongside resistance fighters and or coalition special
operation units. The empowering of AQAP over the Huthis is not beneficial to Yemen, the
entire region, and the United States. The inherent problem with providing a cohesive
solution to this problem is it requires fighting COIN against three groups rather than just
43

one. This sort of solution is costly and ill desired by the coalition. However, actively pursuing
new CT operations is likely to act as triage to the situation and provide future leverage to
ascertain a better solution.
5. Humanitarian Aid
Humanitarian aid has not been getting to nearly 17 million people in need of it. While,
providing humanitarian aid in a war zone is not easy for obvious reasons of safety, a larger
hindrance has come from the coalition’s strong security policies. The coalition has achieved
air-supremacy and maritime blockades which limit re-supply of arms and munitions to the
Huthis but also limit humanitarian aid shipments. The coalition has been letting in some
humanitarian aid but the vetting process is slow and rigorous. The result is aid not reaching
those who need it most neither at all nor in a timely fashion. The solution to this is not ideal
but, decreasing the vetting process to increase the speed of humanitarian aid coming in has
a larger benefit for COIN in Yemen.
The decrease in vetting standards or process is surely guaranteed to increase outside resupplies to the Huthis. However, the current situation is alienating the population and
entrenching the coalition in a protracted war. Reverting back to the policy prescription of
motivating the population to win this COIN is founded in getting humanitarian aid to those
potential resistance fighters and motivating them. Yemen is the second most highly gun
populated country in the world (Karp, p.2, 2011). So, re-armaments from Iran or other
sources are minimal in the long-term and broader context of this COIN campaign. Providing
much needed goods and services to the population outweighs the costs incurred from
increasing aid shipments and decreasing the vetting process of potential arm shipments.
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